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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Prakaiwan Vajrabhaya 
 
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
Department of Linguistics  
 
December 2016 
 
Title: Cross-Modal Reduction: Repetition of Words and Gestures 
 
 
This dissertation examines speakers’ production of speech and representational 
gesture. It utilizes the Repetition Effect as the investigative tool. The Repetition Effect 
appears to vary by the tendency for some items to shorten when repeating, at least under 
the condition that speakers can primarily operate by their assumption of the state of 
knowledge of the listener.  
In speech, a highly conventionalized form of performance, word duration reduces 
within the same stretch of coherent discourse; then, it resets in the first mention of a new 
stretch of coherent discourse regardless of the state of knowledge to the speaker or the 
listener.  Therefore, the Repetition Effect in speech is best analyzed as an automatic 
behavior triggered by discourse structure, rather than reflecting online changes in word 
accessibility for either interlocutor, be it for the speaker (Listener-neutral explanation) or 
for the listener (Listener-modeling explanation). The Repetition Effect in speech 
production in this dissertation will be accounted for within an exemplar model of the 
perception/production loop.   
However, in representational gestures, a much less conventionalized form of 
performance compared to speech, the Repetition Effect shows a different pattern. When 
speakers only operate by their assumption of the state of knowledge of the listener, 
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without dynamic, appreciable listener feedback, they steadily reduce most types of 
representational gesture across tellings.  Based on these results, it can be argued that 
representational gestures primarily serve as a part of speech production, rather than as 
communicative acts.  That is, they are produced without regard to the novelty of the 
information to the listener, thus, consistent with the Listener-neutral explanation.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
1.  Introduction  
 When we enter a conversation, we enter with a set of presuppositions about the 
world, and importantly, about the listener. The presupposition we make about our 
listener, i.e., the evaluation we make about who they are, what they already know, and 
the context in which the conversation takes place, influences the production we make. 
The way I describe my research to others depends on my evaluation of the audience. 
Although I am essentially talking about the same general topic, what my work is about, 
the way I explain it to my parents and the way I explain it to colleagues at a conference 
are vastly distinctive. The assumption I make about how much my parents already know 
about psycholinguistics and the assumption I make about how much my colleagues 
already know about psycholinguistics drive the overall structure of the conversation; it 
drives my decision of what to include or exclude from the conversation and how the 
information should be presented.  This is a simple example of large scale planning,  
by way of modeling the listener’s state of knowledge, and how it plays a role in speech 
production.    
Speakers also show listener-sensitivity via listener modeling in local execution. 
Production choices, such as lexical item and grammatical item, can reflect speakers’ 
assumption of the state of knowledge of the listener.  For instance, speakers’ choice to 
refer to a document as a W-2 as opposed to a Wage and Tax Statement shows an 
assumption that the listener has prior knowledge of the document. In grammar, when 
speakers use a pronoun to refer to a referent (e.g., she vs. Pat), it is a reflection of the 
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speakers’ assumption of the state of knowledge of the listener, the assumption that the 
listener knows she and Pat are the same person. In addition to lexical choices and 
grammar, speakers may show listener-sensitivity via word duration.  That is, word 
duration may vary depending on the assumption speakers make about what the listener 
knows. In sum, speakers can show their sensitivity to the listener in large scale planning 
or small scale planning.   
In addition, it is evident that speakers of various ages, genders, and cultures also 
produce representational gestures in concert with speech; as a result, there has been an 
academic movement that is dedicated to the study of representational gestures in relations 
to speech in recent decades. Like speech, past literature have suggested that speakers’ 
production of representational gestures are also a product of speakers’ modeling the state 
of knowledge of the listener.  Briefly speaking, the way people produce representational 
gestures differs based on their assumption of what the listener has already heard or 
already knows. Although speaking and gesturing are of two distinct modalities, they 
appear to demonstrate that speakers take into consideration the state of knowledge of the 
listener.   
In recognition that the two modalities go hand-in-hand, the overarching goal of 
this dissertation is to examine speakers’ production holistically, investigating both speech 
production and representational gesture production via the same data. By doing so, it 
allows documentation of both types of production under a specific condition, which 
highlights the similarities and differences between them.   
Importantly, this dissertation bridges a gap in the literature. Literature in both 
speech production and representational gesture production that argue for listener-
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sensitivity via modeling the state of knowledge of the listener have not provided 
sufficient control in the experiments.  Examining the literature, most studies have allowed 
interlocutors to interact freely, making it problematic to determine the source of listener-
sensitivity, namely, whether listener-sensitivity arises from modeling the state of 
knowledge of the listener (i.e., purely a result of the speakers’ assumption) or listener-
sensitivity arises from an on-going interaction between interlocutors. Essentially, this 
dissertation tests the notion of listener-modeling, to see whether the speakers’ modeling 
of the listener without appreciable input from the listener will affect speaker production. 
Specifically, do speakers emphasize or de-emphasize productions of material presumed 
to be novel or familiar to the listener?  
This dissertation utilizes the Repetition Effect as the investigative tool. I will 
demonstrate that the Repetition Effect is specific to modality, particularly under the 
condition that speakers can only operate by their assumption of the state of knowledge of 
the listener. In speech, a highly conventionalized form of performance, word duration 
reduces within the same stretch of coherent discourse; then, it resets in the first mention 
of a new stretch of coherent discourse regardless of the state of knowledge to the speaker 
or the listener.  Therefore, the Repetition Effect in speech is best analyzed as an 
automatic behavior triggered by discourse structure, rather than reflecting online changes 
in word accessibility for either interlocutor, be it for the speaker (Listener-neutral 
explanation) or for the listener (Listener-modeling explanation). The Repetition Effect in 
speech production in this dissertation will be accounted for within an exemplar model of 
the perception/production loop.   
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However, in representational gestures, a much less conventionalized form of 
performance compared to speech, the Repetition Effect shows a different pattern.  Under 
the condition that speakers can only operate by their assumption of the state of 
knowledge of the listener, without dynamic, appreciable listener feedback, speakers 
steadily reduce most types of representational gesture across tellings.  Based on these 
results, it can be argued that most types representational gestures primarily serve as a part 
of speech production, rather than a communicative act.  That is, they are produced 
without regard to the novelty of the information to the listener, thus, consistent with the 
Listener-neutral explanation.   
In this chapter, multiple bodies of literature across modalities will be grouped by 
models posited by various authors. Section two of this chapter will be dedicated to 
grounding and defining key terms used throughout the dissertation. Section three will 
discuss literature on the Listener-neutral explanation; section four will discuss literature 
on the Listener-modeling explanation.  Within the discussion of each explanation, 
literature on speech will precede literature on representational gesture. The literature will 
be primarily situated in studies that utilize the repetition paradigm, which results in the 
Repetition Effect, to examine speakers’ production.   
In section five, I will highlight problematic interpretations of the Repetition Effect 
that are anchored in the notion of information status (new vs. old/given) and problematic 
interpretations of the Repetition Effect that are accounted for with the Listener-modeling 
explanation.  I will, then, propose an experimental method that eliminates a confound that 
exists in past literature.   
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2.  Definitions  
 To avoid confusion of terminology, this section is dedicated to defining key terms 
that are indispensible to the dissertation. Although there may be terms in previous 
literature that are similar or overlapping with the definitions below, the dissertation will 
be operationalized by the definitions stated in this section.   
2.1.  Definition: A Listener-neutral explanation   
 A Listener-neutral explanation is defined as any online processing explanation of 
speakers’ production that does not explicitly indicate an inherent reference to the listener. 
In this explanation, speakers’ production is taken to be driven by internal cognitive 
processes; however, speakers’ internal cognitive processes may not the only component 
that influences production.  Indeed, speakers may be taking the listener into account 
(modeling of the listener) under this explanation; however, this explanation takes internal 
cognitive processes as the primary component that influences production; other factors 
are considered secondary.   
In addition, this definition has a limited scope; it only accounts for specific 
aspects of speakers’ production, i.e., duration of a repeated word and motoric 
commitment and effort used in a repeated representational gesture. In sum, this definition 
is not intended be extended beyond the current scope to account for other aspects of 
speaker production.  For instance, it should not be construed to account for speakers’ 
choice of a repeated lexical item.    
2.2.  Definition: Common ground 
 The term common ground is often used to explain speakers’ sensitivity to the 
listener, an audience design of sort (e.g., Clark & Carlson, 1981; Clark & Haviland, 1977; 
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Clark & Marshall, 2002; Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983; Stalnaker, 2002; Stalnaker, 
1978).  According to Clark (1992), common ground is defined as “the sum of 
[interlocutors’] mutual knowledge, mutual beliefs, and mutual suppositions” (p. 3). The 
term is widely used in linguistics to demonstrate that speakers’ linguistic choices are 
made based on common ground they believe is shared with the listener; for example, 
Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) reported that speakers switch to names rather than a 
description of a referent when speakers believe that common ground is shared between 
them and the listener (see also Brennan & Clark, 1996 on lexical entrainment and 
conceptual pact and Lockridge & Brennan, 2002 on syntactic choices based on common 
ground).  Although common ground has been widely used in studies of spoken language, 
it has been applied to studies in representational gesture in recent years (e.g., Gerwing & 
Bavelas, 2004; Holler, 2009; Holler & Stevens, 2007; Holler & Wilkin, 2009) to explain 
variation in production of representational gesture as a function of speakers’ sensitivity to 
the listener.   
Horton & Kaysar (1995), however, raised an important point that the classic 
definition of common ground does not clearly and sufficiently indicate when common 
ground comes into play in language production; in their words “we do know at what 
point in the utterance construction the production system incorporates the speaker’s 
knowledge of common ground.  We do not know whether common ground guides the 
initial planning utterances or whether the incorporation of common ground occurs rather 
late in the process” (p. 93). Because of the uncertainty in the timing common ground 
interplays with production, Horton & Kaysar (1995) conducted an experiment which 
imposed a time constraint, a way to increase a cognitive load; they showed that when 
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there is no time constraint, speakers operate by the Initial Design model, which entails 
that speakers employ common ground in the planning stage of an utterance; however, 
when a time constraint is imposed, speakers operate by the Monitoring and Adjustment 
model, which entails that speakers do not employ common ground in the planning stage 
of the utterance and that sensitivity to the state of knowledge of the listener is absent. In 
this model, linguistic output is likely post hoc rather than ad hoc; the output may 
constantly change, via monitoring, over the course of speech production.  Based on 
Horton & Kaysar’s (1995) work, it could be inferred that common ground may only 
occur in a specific context and perhaps should not be treated as necessarily involved 
when interlocutors share the same information with the speaker.  
For the purpose of grounding the term in this dissertation, common ground will be 
strictly defined as a form of listener modeling by the speaker; that is, it refers to speakers’ 
belief about what knowledge is shared between them and the listener prior to the current 
production (the Initial Design model).  Such belief leads to the assumption and evaluation 
they make about what the listener already knows, which drives their choices during 
production (see section 2.3 in this chapter). 
2.3.  Definition: A Listener-modeling explanation 
 A Listener-modeling explanation is defined as any processing explanation of 
speakers’ production that explicitly indicates an inherent reference to the listener.  In this 
explanation, speakers’ production is assumed to be influenced by their sensitivity to the 
listener. As a result of the speakers’ assumption of the state of knowledge of the listener, 
they may modify or adapt their production in order to fulfill communicative needs for the 
listener.  Such assumption of the state of knowledge of the listener is what the speakers 
  8
possess prior to engaging in an interaction with the listener.  The definition is closely tied 
to the notion of common ground, as defined in section 2.2 in this chapter.  It is important 
to emphasize that, as contradictory to the name as it may seem, the Listener-modeling 
explanation is nevertheless, very much about the speaker’s internal cognitive processes. 
This explanation is not concerned with what speakers might do in response to listener 
behavior, nor is it about the interaction between interlocutors.  
2.4.  Definition: A Listener-interactive explanation 
 A Listener-interactive explanation is defined as any processing explanation of 
speakers’ production that explicitly references the listener in response to listener’s verbal 
and/or non-verbal behavior.  In contrast to the Listener-modeling explanation, the 
Listener-interactive explanation is grounded in the dynamic and rapid exchanges of 
verbal and non-verbal cues, which interlocutors exchange and negotiate throughout the 
course of an active interaction.  Importantly, listener-interaction is distinct from the 
speakers’ assumption of the listener’s state of knowledge, which the speakers hold prior 
to the current interaction (in contrast to the Listener-modeling explanation, see section 
2.3 in this chapter).   
Several bodies of literature across disciplines situate themselves in this 
explanation. Two well-recognized works by Clark & Schaefer (1989) and Goodwin 
(1981) discussed in depth how interlocutors manage a conversation through exchanging 
linguistic and non-linguistic means; for example: how interlocutors respond to one 
another utilizing a variety of linguistic structure, how gaze affects turn-taking, and how 
nodding plays a role in an interaction.  In this explanation, speech, gesture, and bodily 
movements are factored into the mechanism that drives production.  
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2.4.  Definition: The Repetition Effect 
In speech, words vary in duration. Duration of a word may vary depending on 
whether it is being said for the first time (initial mention) or it is being repeated 
(subsequent mention). The phenomenon has been well-documented in speech literature 
(e.g., Anderson & Howarth, 2002; Aylett & Turk, 2006 and 2004; Baker & Bradlow, 
2009; Bard & Aylette, 2005; Bell, Brenier, Gregory, Girand, & Jurafsky, 2009; Fisher & 
Tokura; 1995; Freeman, 2014; Fowler, 1988; Fowler, Levy, & Brown, 1997; Fowler & 
Housum, 1987; Galati & Brennan, 2010; Lam & Watson, 2010; Pluymaekers, Ernestus, 
& Baayen, 2005; Vajrabhaya & Kapatsinski, 2011).  Similarly, representational gestures 
have been found to vary in multiple aspects, depending on whether it is being performed 
for the first time or is being performed in repetition (e.g., Galati & Brennan, 2013; 
Gerwing & Bavelas, 2004; Hoetjes, Koolen, Goodbeek, Krahmer, & Swerts, 2011; 
Jacobs & Garnham, 2007; Masson-Carro, Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2014).   
In this dissertation, the phenomenon will be referred to as the Repetition Effect.  
Despite the mounting evidence for the Repetition Effect in both modalities, the reason 
why it exists remains elusive. Linguists and gesture researchers have long been interested 
in the Repetition Effect, for it provides insight into processes in speech production and 
processes in production of representational gesture (see section 3.2.2 and section 4.1 in 
this chapter).   
2.5. Definition: Representational gesture 
Despite the fact that gestures are tightly integrated with speech and are virtually 
impossible to suppress during speech production (Kendon, 2004; Kendon, 1994; 
McNeill, 2005; McNeill, 1992), the reason why people gesture, however, remains 
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elusive.  Unlike spoken language, which at least synchronically-speaking, has a stable 
bond between form and meaning, the act of gesturing varies in the degree of 
conventionalization. “Kendon’s continuum” (McNeill, 2005; McNeill, 1992) categorizes 
conventionality into four stages. Figure 1 is a replica of McNeill’s (2005) continuum of 
conventionalization (p. 4).   
 
Figure 1: McNeill’s (2005) Continuum 3: relationship to conventions 
 
 
 
Although all four acts of gesturing on the continuum involve the use of hands and 
forearms, they vary significantly in the magnitude of conventionalization.   
The leftmost on the continuum is gesticulation, gestures that are performed along side 
speech, where the “lack of convention is an attribute sine qua non” (p. 5, emphasis is 
original).  That is, there is no standard form and meaning counterpart between gesturing 
and speech; for example, there is no standardized hand shape for COFFEE in 
gesticulation. In contrast, the rightmost on the continuum is sign language, where full-
fledged conventionalized gestures are used to express meaning. For instance, in 
American Sign Language, COFFEE is gestured with two hands that are formed in a fist-
like shape, moving in a circular motion.   People who have knowledge of American Sign 
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Language can encode and decode COFFEE by using such gesture (hand sign) due to its 
highly conventionalized form and meaning pairing.  
In this dissertation, the only kind of gesturing that is of interest is gesticulation, 
the least conventionalized kind of gesturing. The term representational gesture, which is 
a kind of iconic gesticulation is defined by McNeill (2005) as “[presenting] images of 
concrete entities and/or actions […] its manner of execution embodies picturable aspects 
of semantic content (aspects of which are also present in speech)” (p. 39) will be used in 
this dissertation.  Unless stated otherwise, all references to gestures in this dissertation 
refer to representational gesture.  
Figure 2 exemplifies a representational gesture. In this example, while the speaker 
says the rabbit is hopping out of the room, she also raises her slightly bent index and 
middle finger and performs a hopping away motion from her body.  
 
Figure 2: An example of a representational gesture 
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This is a representational gesture since the hand shape represents the rabbit, the 
arch motion represents the rabbit hopping, and the away from the body trajectory 
represents the direction the rabbit is going.  In short, the entity (the rabbit), the motion 
(hopping), and the trajectory (out of the room) are presented in speech and 
representational gesture, coinciding with McNeill’s definition.  Note that the semantic 
content of the representational gesture is unfolded when it is accompanied by speech, in 
contrast to hand signs which do not require speech for the semantic content of the 
message to unfold. In short, a representational gesture per se does not carry a concrete 
semantic content; speech is obligatory.   
Although representational gestures have been found to bear an informative value 
when accompanying speech in the sense that listeners can gain a better comprehension of 
the message (Alibali, Flevares, & Goldin-Meadow, 1997; Beattie & Shovelton, 2005; 
Singer & Goldin-Meadow, 2005), Hostetter & Alibali (2008) have suggested that the 
communicative value of representational gesture, perhaps, should not be taken at face 
value.  Listeners resorting to a representational gesture’s semantic content may be largely 
dependent on the lack of redundancy of the message conveyed.  In other words, listeners 
may make use of gestural information when the information in speech, the primary mode 
of communication, is absent or lacking. Whether representational gesture encodes 
semantic content for the listener or how much information the listener decodes from 
gesture is beyond the scope of the dissertation. The dissertation will only be concerned 
with the production aspect.    
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3.  The Listener-neutral explanation in repetition paradigm studies  
In this section, literature on the Repetition Effect in speech and in gesture that 
coincides with the Listener-neutral explanation will be discussed. Theories discussed in 
this section may differ in their components; however, they are unified with one element: 
these explanations are grounded in the framework that the Repetition Effect is driven by 
the speakers’ production system and does not have an inherent reference to the listener 
(see a full definition, section 2.1 in this chapter).   
3.1. The Repetition Effect in speech 
Linguistically speaking, the Repetition Effect could result in a fewer number of 
words used (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), or it could result in subsequent mentions 
being shorter in duration when compared to the first mention of the same word. (e.g., 
Anderson & Howarth, 2002; Aylett & Turk, 2006 and 2004; Baker & Bradlow, 2009; 
Bell et al., 2009; Fisher & Tokura; 1995; Freeman, 2014; Fowler, 1988; Fowler et al., 
1997; Fowler & Housum, 1987; Galati & Brennan, 2010; Lam & Watson, 2010; 
Pluymaekers et al., 2005; Vajrabhaya & Kapatsinski, 2011). Several prominent 
explanations of the Repetition Effect in speech that coincide with the Listener-neutral 
model can be generally categorized into three areas: (1) automatization in articulatory 
planning; (2) speed of lexical access; and (3) bidirectional adjustment prosodic 
prominence.   
3.1.1.  The Repetition Effect in speech as a result of automatization in articulatory 
planning 
To reiterate, when a motoric action is repeated, it reduces. Speech, being a kind of 
motoric action, operates by this concept. Bybee (2002a, 2001) proposed that repetition 
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causes automatization in articulatory sequences, thereby causing reduction.  Simply put, 
words are automatically reduced when they are repeated due to the characteristics of the 
human’s speech production system. Consistent with Bybee’s proposal, Kapatsinski 
(2010) believes that upcoming phonological gestural targets of a repeated word (a word 
that has been practiced) are anticipated and activated faster as the word is being executed 
(relative to preceding phonological gestural targets within the same word).  The rapid 
activation of anticipated phonological gestural targets (after word execution has started) 
results in shorter word duration (see also Dell, Burger, & Svec, 1997).  
 
Figure 3:  Repetition priming  
 
 
 
Figure 3 is a simplified demonstration of Kapatsinski’s (2010) explanation of 
repetition priming, which results in hypoarticulation in subsequent mention.  In this 
explanation, once a word has been produced (in this case, the first mention), the word, as 
well as its segmental phonetic details, becomes activated.  The activation lessens pressure 
of having to retrieve segments within the word; therefore, speakers can look-ahead at a 
faster rate to the next segment, resulting in a more rapid execution of motoric production, 
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and essentially leading to hypoarticulation.  Therefore, it is repetition priming that is 
primarily responsible for the Repetition Effect.    
3.1.2.  The Repetition Effect as a result of speed of lexical access 
Another explanation that is consistent with the Listener-neutral explanation is by 
Bell et al. (2009), who argued that it is not necessarily a reduction of word duration in 
subsequent mention (as explained in section 3.1.1.); rather it is a lexical access difficulty 
that speakers encounter when retrieving the word that results in lengthening the first 
mention.  Bell et al.’s (2009) proposal is highly plausible; however, priming is known to 
affect infrequent words more than it affects frequent words (the frequency attenuation 
effect, Forster & Davis, 1984 et seq.). Over time, priming results in the effect of word 
frequency on lexical access speed being logarithmic rather than linear (e.g. Broadbent, 
1967; Goldiamond & Hawkins, 1958; Howes & Solomon, 1951; Norris & McQueen, 
2008; Oldfield & Wingfield, 1965).  
Given the frequency attenuation effect, lexical access should be facilitated by 
mentioning a word to a greater extent when that word is infrequent. And since the 
frequency attenuation effect holds for both production and perception (frequency effects 
are logarithmic in both, cf. Howes & Solomon, 1951; Oldfield & Wingfield, 1965), it 
becomes problematic to interpret whether the Repetition Effect is caused by accessibility 
of the word to the speaker or accessibility of the word to the listener.  Furthermore, since 
repetition should affect low-frequency words (a production that has not yet been 
automatized) more than it should affect high-frequency words (a production that has been 
automatized) (e.g. Kapatsinski, 2010) in accordance with the Power Law of Practice 
(Logan, 1988; Seibel 1963), it leaves room for an alternative explanation.  
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Although Bell et al. (2009) discussed first-mention lengthening being driven 
specifically by lexical access difficulties, it is worthwhile to note that word lengthening 
could be driven by any kind of processing difficulty, as long as that processing difficulty 
competes for resources with the speaker’s articulatory planning or the listener’s utterance 
comprehension processes.  For example, Vajrabhaya & Kapatsinski (2011) conducted an 
interactive map-task in Thai, where the speaker directs the listener where each animal 
picture (target word) should be located on the board. Speakers told and retold two 
different “stories” involving these animal pictures to each listener, where each “story” 
consisted of the same set of animal pictures, but the pictures were arranged differently on 
the speaker’s board.  In other words, the only difference between stories was the 
arrangement of animal pictures.  Results showed word duration to systematically 
lengthens in the first mention of each story, regardless of story or listener, which appears 
to coincide with Bell et al.’s (2009) proposal of first-mention lengthening, rather than 
subsequent-mention reduction.   
It is possible that the greater length at first mention found in this study is due to a 
broader version of the processing difficulty. When an animal picture (target word) was 
first mentioned in a story, the speaker may have been in the midst of planning the spatial 
description of the picture in relation to other pictures on the board. It could be argued that 
speakers could delay production instead of lengthening the word while engaged in the 
process of planning the utterance. This, however, does not seem plausible since all the 
target words examined were in the medial position, thus, first-mention lengthening is 
likely to have derived from a processing difficulty.  In addition, the listener may also 
needed time to locate the corresponding animal picture to match the speaker’s spatial 
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description. Therefore, first-mention lengthening observed in this study could have been 
due to a task effect. In sum, any kind of processing difficulties could be influencing word 
duration, especially when it is completing with the speaker’s articulatory planning or the 
listener’s comprehension.   
Furthermore, Fowler et al. (1997) reported first-mention lengthening and 
suggested that it is the result of a conventionalized discourse structure.  The argument in 
their study is problematic since there exists a confound in their stimuli which elicit a 
heavier processing load in the first mention.  In other words, it is difficult to interpret 
whether first-mention lengthening in their study was driven by discourse structure as they 
suggested or it was driven by difficulties in processing on the speaker’s part.  Because of 
this, first-mention lengthening observed in Fowler et al.’s data could have been a task 
effect, similar to in Vajrabhaya & Kapatsinski (2011), where the task demanded that 
speakers utilize higher cognitive processing in the first mention.   
To elaborate on their work, in Experiment I, Fowler et al. had six American 
English speakers narrate an episode of a TV series to a listener they had just met. The 
narration was coded for “episode boundaries” using a variety of discourse and content 
cues to narrative discontinuity. They observed significant shortening within the resulting 
episodes but not across episode boundaries, concluding that “an episode boundary blocks 
shortening” (p.21).  
In Experiment II, Fowler et al. asked 12 participants to read stories in which some 
paragraphs began with cues to a change of scene. Again, shortening was blocked when 
mentions were separated by an explicit cue to change of scene (“but in another scene”) 
and was not blocked when the scenes formed a single narrative, the change marked by 
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“but weeks later”. Fowler et al. referred to the effect as blocking shortening rather than 
lengthening since they did not find significant lengthening across episode boundaries 
(p.21, fn.2), although they did observe numerical trends towards lengthening across 
episode boundaries.   
Based on these results, they raised the possibility that the blocking of shortening 
across stories (first-mention lengthening in this case) as “the way you tell a story” in 
English. However, they discarded this explanation in favor of an online accessibility-
based explanation. The “more fundamental” reason to reject the conventionalized 
explanation for them was that “Some recent findings of our own and of other researchers 
lead us to doubt that durational shortening and blocking of shortening are markers 
provided deliberately for listeners by speakers” (Fowler et al., 1997, p.38).  
Fowler et al. (1997, p.38) also mentioned another “reason for doubting that our 
speakers used blocking of shortening as an optional or alternative marker of a 
discontinuity in a narrative is simply that it is not obvious why references to a [change in] 
film or scene should not have served the same purpose as the time/location markers”. To 
respond to their comment, it is possible that a change in time/location does not signal an 
end to one narrative/story and the beginning of another, while a change in the film being 
narrated or explicit switch of scene does.  
Consider the excerpts from Fowler et al.’s (1997, p.33) stimuli in (1)-(2). In (1), 
the narrative continuity is entirely broken by the scene-changing “episode transition”: the 
description of the next scene has no logical connection to the preceding scene (see 
[Boundary inserted below]. In contrast, the narrative storyline continues fluidly through 
the time/location episode transition in (2). It is, therefore, suggested that Fowler et al.’s 
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data seem consistent with the proposal that story/narrative boundaries trigger the speaker 
to lengthen words when they are mentioned for the first time within the new story.  
 
(1) …The old woman was very happy to see the boys and asked them to stay for 
tea. They couldn’t stay, but [Boundary] in another scene, you see the nanny 
regaling Martin with stories about Aloysius when he was a little boy at 
Maidenhead.  
(2)   “…The old woman was very happy to see the boys and asked them to stay 
for tea. They couldn’t stay, but [Boundary] weeks later, the nanny visited 
them and regaled Martin with stories about Aloysius when he was a little boy 
at Maidenhead.  
 
A major limitation of Fowler et al.’s stimulus design is that first mention in their 
study is confounded with being located in the episode-initial sentence. While the first 
mention of a word within a story or episode does not, in general, occur in the first 
sentence of the story or episode, they do in Fowler et al.’s stimuli, as in (1)-(2). Episode-
initial sentences have been found to elicit a higher processing load (e.g. Haberlandt, 
Berian, & Sandson, 1980; den Uyl & van Oostendorp, 1980); therefore, first-mention 
lengthening in their work could be an artifact of heavier processing load on the speaker’s 
part and not necessarily driven by discourse structure; this is a similar concern to 
Vajrabhaya & Kapatsinski (2011).   
3.1.3.  The Repetition Effect as a result of prosodic prominence  
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One of the functions of the indefinite article a/an in English is to code a referent 
that is entering discourse, signifying that the referent is new.  Once that referent has 
entered into discourse, the definite article the in English functions to code that such 
referent is old/given (See Du Bois, 1980; Givón, 1984, for example). In speech 
production, coding of information status can be found prosodically in addition to 
syntactic coding.  
The notion of information status could be construed to be consistent with the 
Listener-modeling explanation (see section 4 in this chapter). In other words, speakers 
could be modeling the state of knowledge of the listener, treating a certain referent as 
new or old/given, by factoring in whether the listener has been exposed to the referent 
before vs. not. The decision for speakers to code a referent as new or old/given via 
grammar or prosody could be the result of the speakers’ modeling of the state of 
knowledge of the listener. This dissertation, however, categorizes coding of information 
status under the Listener-neutral explanation, rather than the Listener-modeling 
explanation, for the following reasons.   
Firstly, it is unclear to whom information status applies to; that is, whether the 
information is new to the speaker or whether the information is new to the listener. In the 
same direction, it is unclear whether the information is old/given to the speaker or the 
whether the information is old/given to the listener. Although studies in this section 
anchored themselves within the realm of information status, they do not explicitly 
address this particular confound between information status to the speaker vs. listener.   
In addition, the definition of Listener-modeling (see section 2.3 in this chapter) 
ascribes that there must be an explicit inherent reference to the listener. Since studies in 
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this section do not make an explicit inherent reference to the listener, it is more 
conservative, in my opinion, to categorize such work to be consistent with the Listener-
neutral explanation.  In this dissertation, I will be operating under the premise that 
information status of a referent, new or old/given, applies to the speaker, not the listener 
due to lack thereof explicit inherent reference to the listener.   
Fundamental frequency (f0) has been argued to code whether a referent is new or 
old/given in discourse (Bolinger, 1972; Brown, 1983; Halliday 1967; Chafe 1976; 
Selkrik, 1996; Yule, 1980). Proponents of this view suggested that in the initial mention, 
when speakers introduce a new referent into discourse, a higher f0 is used.   In contrast, 
when the same information repeated in the same discourse, it becomes old/given 
information; hence, a lower f0 is used. Furthermore, Swerts & Geluykens (1994) provided 
experimental evidence to support the relationship between pitch peaks, the maxima f0, to 
coincide with newness of information status; on the other hand, when a referent becomes 
old/given information, for instance through repetition, lower f0 is found (Sridhar, 
Nenkova, Narayanan, & Jurafsky, 2008).  
In particular, Aylett & Turk (2004) proposed that the effect of repetition on 
duration is mediated by online assignment of prosodic prominence. Under this view, 
words mentioned for the first time undergo accentual lengthening by being assigned 
prosodic focus, which is marked by high f0 and high intensity, as well as increased 
duration; indeed, conveying that the focused element is new information (in the first 
mention) has been argued to be a major function of prosodic focus.  That is, new 
information, (the first mention) receives prosodic prominence; whereas, old/given 
  22
information (repeated mention) of the same referent, does not receive prosodic 
prominence.  
The claim that f0 is highly associated with information status is nevertheless, 
controversial. Fowler & Housum (1987) showed that repeated words, which are 
considered old/given, exhibit a significantly shorter duration and lower intensity; 
however, f0 was not found to differ. Along the same line, Issacs & Watson (2010) 
reported that it is duration and intensity (loudness measured in decibel) that are reflected 
in new information, not f0. Furthermore, Terken & Hirschberg (1994) report that high f0 is 
not necessarily restricted to new information: old/given information that is in a certain 
syntactic role in a coherent stretch of discourse can also bear high f0 just like new 
information. Hence, there is not a transparent relationship between high f0 and newness 
information.  
 Work that has systematically examined the relations between duration, f0 and 
intensity questions the notion that the three variables should be collapsed together under 
the notion of prosodic prominence. In particular, Baker & Bradlow (2009), Fowler & 
Housum (1987), Isaacs & Watson (2010), and Lam & Watson (2010) suggested that 
repetition most robustly affects duration, rather than f0 or intensity. In particular, Fowler 
& Housum (1987) and Isaacs & Watson (2010) measured both f0 and duration in the 
same tokens and found that first and subsequent mentions reliably differed in duration but 
not in f0.   
In addition, Baker & Bradlow (2009) asked naïve phoneticians who were blind to 
the first vs. second-mention condition to code their recordings using the ToBI prosodic 
annotation system.  As predicted by Aylett & Turk (2004), Baker & Bradlow (2009) 
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found that second mentions, the repetition of the same word, were less likely to be 
accented than first mentions. However, a significant effect of mention remained when 
both first and second mentions were accented or both were unaccented.  Similarly, Aylett 
& Turk (2004) found a significant effect of repetition on duration after controlling for 
prosodic factors. While Aylett & Turk (2004) claimed that this was likely due to 
imperfections in the prosodic coding, they acknowledged that it could also mean that the 
Repetition Effect on duration is not fully mediated by prosodic prominence. Based on this 
work, it is possible that repetition will affect f0 in addition to duration, but it is very likely 
that duration would be affected to a greater extent.   
Intensity is an additional cue to prosodic prominence. Lam & Watson (2010) 
found that repetition had a stronger effect on duration than on intensity (while 
predictability mainly influenced intensity and had negligible effects on duration). This 
finding, again, suggests that prosodic prominence, which is strongly correlated with high 
f0 and intensity, is unlikely to fully mediate the effect of repetition on duration.  
In sum, the Repetition Effect appears to be robustly reflected in word duration, 
but not necessarily in f0. In other words, when a referent/word is new in discourse, 
presumably via first mention, its duration is consistently longer than its repeated 
counterparts. However, there does not appear to be a systematic pattern of f0 as a function 
of information status.  Perhaps, word duration is the primary cue in conveying 
information status in repeated referents, and f0 is a secondary cue.   
3.2. The Listener-neutral explanation in representational gesture 
 The primary function of speech is to communicate.  The function of a 
representational gesture, however, remains debatable.  This section will begin with 
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prominent models of representational gesture production that are compatible with the 
Listener-neutral explanation; then, it will be followed by recent work on the Repetition 
Effect in representational gesture that coincides with the Listener-neutral explanation.   
3.2.1. The Listener-neutral explanation: Models of representational gesture production  
In this view, representational gestures are performed to benefit the speaker 
cognitively for the purpose of speech planning; thus, the direct function of a 
representational gesture is for the speaker.  One prima facie case that representational 
gestures are for the speaker is that congenitally blind children engaging in a face-to face 
conversation performed representational gestures comparably to sighted children and 
children who are blind-folded (Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 2001; Iverson & Goldin-
Meadow 1997).  Furthermore, Jalec & Jaworska (2014) reported that blind children 
employ representational gesture when they express complex concepts, entailing that 
gesturing helps them in thinking and speech production.  If children who are blind from 
birth behave similarly to children in the other two groups when expressing complex 
thoughts, then it is reasonable to deduce that gestures are rooted in the speaker’s internal 
production system rather than a learned behavior or a behavior that has inherent reference 
to the listener, which possibly has an intention to communicate.   
Several models of representational gesture production have been proposed to spell 
out the Listener-neutral explanation. These models attempt to account for the role 
representational gestures play in various stages of the production system. The Lexical 
Retrieval Hypothesis (Krauss, Chen, & Gottesman, 2000; Krauss, Chen, & Chawla, 
1996) asserts that the primary function of representational gestures is specifically for 
retrieving a lexeme.  Based on Levelt’s (1992) model of speech production, which is a 
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cascading model that begins with the conceptualizer and ends with the articulator, 
representational gestures facilitate speech production at the lemma level, where the stage 
where grammatical encoding occurs.  The facilitation is argued to be carried out via a 
kinesic monitor, which is a cross-model priming, to aid speakers in lexical retrieval. Once 
the word is retrieved and the speaker utters the word, representational gestures are 
terminated since the goal of lexical retrieval has been achieved. Empirical evidence to 
support the Lexical Retrieval Hypothesis includes a higher number words recalled using 
representational gesture  (Frick-Horbury & Guttentag, 1998; Krauss et al., 2000; Kruss et 
al., 1996), resolution of the Tip of the Tongue state (Beattie & Coughlan, 1999), and 
temporal asynchrony of representational gesture onset and speech onset in unfamiliar 
words (Morrel-Samuels & Krauss, 1992). To proponents of the Lexical Retrieval 
Hypothesis, representational gestures do not have a communicative intention, for their 
primary function is to serve a very restricted and local purpose of lexical retrieval 
(Krauss, Dushay, Chen, & Rauscher 1995; Krauss, Morrel-Samuels, & Colasante, 1991).   
Representational gestures, however, have been argued to originate above and 
beyond the lemma level and exhibit functions other than lexical retrieval. The following 
models can be construed as an extension of, as well as compatible with, McNeill’s (1992) 
Growth Point model, a hypothesis that posits a primitive and fundamental unit where 
language and representational gestures emerge and organization of thoughts commence. 
Although these various models may differ in their components, they share a common 
core assumption: representational gestures help speakers in the thought process, 
originating at the conceptualization level of thoughts, a level that precedes the lemma 
level in Levelt’s speech production model.   
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Kita (2000) proposed the Information Packaging Hypothesis, which argues that 
representational gestures help organize thoughts pre-verbally. The model is grounded in 
the assumption that people have a repertoire of semantically-rich spatio-motoric 
information; for such information to be transferred to the verbal form, representational 
gestures assist in breaking down the information into smaller chunks so that it can be 
“packaged” appropriately in the verbal output. Offering empirical evidence that is in 
contrast to the Lexical Retrieval Hypothesis, Alibali, Kita, & Young (2000) showed that 
when there is comparable demand for lexical retrieval but a higher demand for 
conceptual packaging of information, children utilize more representational gestures in 
their description. Such evidence makes a strong case that representational gestures occur 
at the conceptualization level, rather than at the lemma level. Results in Kita (1993), 
exhibiting data from Japanese and English, also support the argument that 
representational gestures function in shaping the linguistic output, thus, suggesting that 
representational gestures lend a hand in organizing rich information in the speaker’s 
production system.  Also compatible with the Information Packaging Hypothesis is the 
Interface model (Kita & Özyürek, 2003), which argues that representational gestures 
facilitate the organization of spatial information pre-verbally; importantly, such 
organization and packaging of information is language specific and may vary depending 
on one’s spatial and verbal skill (Hostetter & Alibali, 2007).  
Along the same line of how representational gestures help the thinking process, 
the Gesture as Simulated Action framework (GSA), proposed by Hostetter & Alibali 
(2008), contends that representational gestures are a mentally simulated action; both 
linguistic input and embodiment act in concert as a unified system in the speaker’s 
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production system. Hostetter & Alibali (2008) reported a much higher representational 
gesture rate when speakers describe how to wrap a package than when they describe a 
cartoon, signifying that a motoric action elicits more representational gestural execution. 
Perhaps, the GSA framework best accounts for a specific type of representational gesture; 
in other words, as Wagner, Malisz, & Kopp (2014) commented, “[the GSA model] 
focuses on action-related (pantomimic) gestures that may directly reflect internal 
simulations during the moment of speaking” (p. 217). The GSA framework is essential to 
this dissertation since the representational gestures data in chapter IV are motorically 
mimetic in nature.   
In contrast to the Lexical Retrieval Hypothesis, the Growth Point model, the 
Information Packaging Hypothesis, the Interface model, and the GSA framework,  
posit that representational gestures are a part of a communicative intention, for the origin 
of representational gestures is at the conceptualization stage, where some messages are to 
be executed via representational gestures while others are to be executed via speech. In 
other words, semantic content which speakers intend to convey can be reflected multi-
modally.  Although Melinger & Levelt (2003) provided evidence to support that 
representational gestures bear a communicative intention, it is plausible that some 
representational gestures may demonstrate more communicative-intention than others, 
depending on circumstance (e.g., the task in hand). It is possible that some 
representational gestures have little to no communicative intention and are simply residue 
of one’s production system.   
It is important to think of a representational gesture as a function-specific act.  
That is, representational gestures should not be viewed as a one-size-fits-all phenomenon; 
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they can serve multiple functions appearing in an array of unconventionalized forms.  For 
example, if a speaker says to her friend that she caught a fish and that the fish is this big 
while holding out both hands, performing a representational gesture to show the fish’s 
size, then the representational gesture functions to carry semantically-rich content that is 
necessary for encoding and decoding absolute size information. In this case, it is evident 
that the representational gesture is meant to be communicative. Although this kind of 
representational gesture carries rich semantic content, it is, nevertheless, a form of 
gesticulation, and not an emblem (see McNeill’s continuum, section 2.5 in this chapter).  
The representational gesture itself is incomplete and likely to be incomprehensible 
without the verbal counterpart of this big; whereas, an emblem requires no accompanying 
speech to encode and decode the semantic content. An extensive discussion of this type 
of representational gesture is in chapter IV of the dissertation.   
On the other hand, a representational gesture can lack communicative intention. 
Recall the bunny hopping out of the room example (see section 2.5 in this chapter). 
Unlike the absolute size representational gesture, the communicative value of 
representational gesture in this case is unclear.  The semantic content of the rabbit is 
hopping out of the room is packaged in speech, the primary mode of communication.  In 
this case, the representational gesture carries highly redundant semantic content; thus, the 
communicative function of such representational gesture is presumably low.  Indeed, 
these two examples indicate two kinds of representational gesture on the extremes in 
terms of the function they serve and how communicatively oriented they are.  Much of 
representational gesture, however, falls in between the two, and it is more difficult to 
determine their function.   
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Since representational gestures vary in function, any simple model of 
representational gesture production would only be able to account for a specific function 
they interplays with, be it retrieving a lexeme, organizing thoughts, or expressing mental 
simulation. Operating under the assumption that representational gestures serve multiple 
functions, these models may be just as equally plausible in their explanation, depending 
on the phenomenon being examined.  In short, no one particular representational gesture 
production model can account for all representational gestures.   
These models are only some of the prominent models that account for the role 
representational gestures play in speech production. Despite the specific details on how 
they assist speakers in speech production or whether they are communicatively-intended, 
one consensus these models share is that they emphasize the function of representational 
gestures in the speaker’s production system without an inherent reference to the listener. 
Hence, these models support the argument that representational gestures are for the 
speaker, which is in line with the Listener-neutral model.   
3.2.2. The Listener-neutral explanation: The Repetition Effect in gesture  
 The Repetition Effect found in representational gesture is unlike the Repetition 
Effect found in sign language (Hoetjes et al., 2011). When hand signs in the Sign 
Language of the Netherlands (NGT) are repeated during signing, the proportion of signs 
(“number of signs divided by duration”) performed remains similar in the first signing 
and subsequent signing.   Note that although they are proportional, the subsequent 
signing appears to be less precise; such decrease in precision is perceptually detectable.  
On the other hand, when representational gestures are repeated, they decrease in number, 
size, and number of hands used (frequently one-handed instead of two). Precision of the 
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repeated representational gesture, similar to NGT, is also lower.  In sum, unlike hand 
signs in NGT, which only reduces qualitatively when repeated, representational gestures 
were found to reduce qualitatively and quantitatively when repeated. This preliminary 
work is of great importance since it is possibly the first experimental work that 
emphasizes quantification of reduction in repeated representational gesture.  
Although Hoetjes et al. (2011) did not position the Repetition Effect in the 
Listener-neutral framework, the results could be interpreted to coincide with the Listener-
neutral framework.  Indeed, such difference in the magnitude of reduction is to be 
expected, considering the degree of conventionalization of NGT and representational 
gesture varies (see McNeill’s continuum, section 2.5 in this chapter). Since hand signs are 
highly conventionalized and carry a rich semantic content for the primary purpose of 
communication, they should be more resistant to reduction in repetition in order to retain 
transparent semantic content; in contrast, representational gestures, which are not at all 
conventionalized, are more prone to reduction in repetition. To elaborate, a hand sign 
carries highly conventionalized meaning, which is parallel to spoken words; therefore, a 
substantial reduction of a sign might have an effect on how a sign is perceived (cf. 
Battinson, 1974 for asymmetry in ASL, although see Sumner, Kim, King, & McGowan, 
2013 on linguistic and external factors that contribute to successful speech perception).  
In contrast, a representational gesture does not carry a conventionalized meaning; 
therefore, reduction is much less likely to affect the meaning, considering the meaning is 
primarily carried out in speech.   
It is possible that in the initial reference, representational gestures benefit speakers 
in speech production and are of great value; however, in the repeated reference when the 
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cognitive demand is lower, possibly due to greater accessibility (see Ariel, 1990; Ariel, 
1988) or rehearsal (see Chawla & Krauss, 1994), the value of gesturing diminishes, 
resulting in reduction (see also discussion in Masson-Carro, Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 
2014).  Therefore, based on this interpretation, reduction in repeated gestures could be 
taken to align with the Listener-neutral explanation since gestures are performed for the 
benefit of the speaker and has no inherent reference to the listener.  
Recent work by Masson-Carro et al. (2014) has shown that in a director-matcher 
task, when speakers are faced with a high cognitive demand due to a time-constraint, the 
Repetition Effect in the production of representational gesture appears to occur less than 
when speakers are not faced with a high cognitive demand.  In other words, the 
magnitude of reduction in subsequent mention varies depending on how much cognitive 
load is imposed on the speaker. When speakers require assistance from a representational 
gesture, they will be more resistant to reduction.  Masson-Carro et al.’s (2014) position is 
consistent with the Listener-neutral explanation; that is, gestures are intended to benefit 
the speaker internal cognitive processes and have no inherent reference to the listener.  In 
particular, they situated their results with Kita’s (2000) Information Packaging 
Hypothesis, a gesture production model that is in line with the Listener-neutral 
explanation.   
4.  The Listener-modeling explanation  
In this section, literature on the Repetition Effect in speech and in gesture that 
coincides with the Listener-modeling explanation (see section 2.3 in this chapter for a full 
definition) will be discussed. In contrast to the Listener-neutral explanation, speakers take 
into consideration the state of knowledge of their listener; their performance is, thus, a 
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production modulated by their sensitivity to the state of knowledge of the listener.  In this 
view, there is an inherent reference to the listener and that speakers’ performance is 
influenced by it.   
4.1.  Listener-modeling in speech: The Repetition Effect 
At least on a coarse-grained level, speakers are assumed to track the listener’s 
state of mind and adjust their production accordingly, making words longer 
(hyperarticulation) when the listener might have trouble understanding them and shorter 
(hypoarticulation) when no such difficulty is expected (see also Frank & Jaeger, 2008; 
Jager, 2010; Lindblom, 1990). In this view a repeated referent is hypoarticulated, making 
word duration shorter, because speakers are assumed to be sensitive to what the listener 
already knows or what the listener has heard before.  
Initially, Fowler and Housum (1987) provided evidence that repeated content 
words undergo reduction when they are used in a spontaneous conversation. Fowler 
(1988) further provided evidence to support the Listener-modeling view with data 
showing that repeated words are reduced when a listener is present; in contrast, repeated 
words do not undergo reduction when they are read from a context-less list into a 
microphone.  The early work by Fowler & Housum (1987) and Fowler (1988) suggested 
that the presence of a listener and context play an important role in the existence of the 
Repetition Effect in speech.   
The notion of listener-modeling was additionally supported by Galati & Brennan 
(2010) who have shown that attenuation occurs when speakers retell a story to someone 
who has heard it; however, attenuation does not occur when speakers retell a story to 
someone who has not heard it. In particular, in the first experiment, they found that 
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duration of target words produced by the speakers, measured acoustically, did not differ 
as a function of the state of knowledge of the listener, nor did it differ as a function of 
state of knowledge of the speakers themselves.  In the second experiment, however, they 
found words that are repeated to the same listener show lower intelligibility (in a clarity 
rating); therefore, Galati & Brennan (2010) argued that although repeated words to 
different listeners may not differ in duration, they differ in how intelligible they are to the 
listener, thus, exhibiting listener-sensitivity.   
It is important to point out that word duration and intelligibility often overlap. 
Generally speaking, a word that is hyperarticulated (often longer in duration) has higher 
intelligibility, and a word that is hypoarticulated (often shorter in duration) has lower 
intelligibility (cf. Lindblom, 1990).  Indeed, the motoric commitment speakers invest in 
articulation of these words differ; hyperarticulation entails more effort than 
hypoarticulation.  That Galati & Brennan (2010) found word duration to not differ as a 
function of state of knowledge of the listener but found intelligibility to differ as a 
function of state of knowledge of the listener indicates less commitment and effort used 
in articulation. In short, when speakers produce words that are shorter in duration or 
speakers produce words that exhibit lower intelligibility, both cases imply less 
commitment and effort used in articulation.   
While the idea that the speaker is running a full-scale simulation of the listener’s 
brain in real time may appear implausible, Galati & Brennan (2010) argued that the 
computational costs associated with modeling the listener can be fairly minimal, a single 
bit of information encoding whether the speaker remembers saying the current word to 
the current listener.  Thus, they proposed that speakers operate by a “one-bit” model 
  34
where speakers take into consideration whether the listener has been exposed to the 
information before.  Their “one-bit” model is consistent with the Listener-modeling 
explanation, for the model explicitly takes into account the state of knowledge of the 
listener.   
One criticism of Galati & Brennan’s (2010) work is that they positioned their 
results in the Listener-modeling framework; in essence, they argue that speakers’ speech 
is driven by modeling the state of knowledge of the listener.  However, naïve speakers 
and listeners were allowed to interact throughout the experiment, which was likely to lead 
to constant exchanges of verbal and non-verbal cues.  Since an interaction may have 
occurred, it is difficult to determine whether the results in their study are purely a product 
of listener modeling or whether the results in their study are a product of the interaction 
between interlocutors.  This is a question that is core to the dissertation and will be 
vigorously discussed the general discussion.   
4.2. Listener-modeling in gesture 
Beattie & Aboudan (1994) reported that speakers gesture the least in a monologue 
and the most in a dialogue, which suggests that listeners are likely to play a role that 
influences speakers’ gesture production.  Indeed, a great bulk of literature is dedicated to 
demonstrating that gesturing is a listener-sensitive act, rather than driven by an internal 
mechanism that assists speakers in the production system (see section 3.1.2 in this 
chapter).  In this view, speakers may modify and adapt their representational gestures in 
order to fulfill communicative needs; hence, they are performed for the listener as a mean 
of social interaction.  
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4.1.1.  Sources of listener-sensitivity in representational gesture production  
Visibility is a common source of evidence that is used to support the notion of 
listener-sensitivity.  Many studies have investigated the effect of visibility on gesture, 
albeit yielding mixed results (see Bavelas & Healing, 2013 for an extensive list and 
discussion of these studies).  While it is true that speakers gesture when there is a lack of 
visibility, for instance, on the telephone (Rimé, 1982; de Ruiter, 1995), speakers gesture 
at a higher rate in the visibility condition (Cohen & Harrison, 1973; Krauss et al. 1995; 
Mol, Krahmer, Maes, & Swerts, 2009a; Mol, Krahmer, Maes, & Swerts 2009b).  Note 
that Alibali et al. (2001) reported speakers gesture at a comparable rate in both visibility 
and lack of visibility condition.  They explained this as the result of imagining an 
interlocutor being present.   
Moreover, Bavelas et al. (2008) reported a qualitative difference in the visibility 
condition, where speakers’ representational gestures contain more semantically-rich 
information (such as larger in size), and speakers explicitly draw the listener’s attention 
to their representational gestures. Furthermore, visibility can lead speakers to adapt their 
representational gesture to the listener’s representational gesture.  Kimbara (2008) and 
Kimbara (2006) reported that when speakers can see the listeners’ representational 
gesture, they adapt and mimic their representational gesture to the listener’s.  Note that 
the act of mimicking is not restricted to between the interlocutors: Kuhlen & 
Seyfeddinipur (2007) showed that speakers mimic representational gesture of those who 
are not the paired interlocutor, and even when those representational gestures were 
viewed briefly.  Despite these studies showing that mimicking of representational gesture 
occurring during an interaction, it is unclear, however, whether the speaker is adapting to 
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the listener’s representational gesture or they are adapting to listener behavior in general.  
These two factors have not been yet teased apart in the literature and require further 
examination.  
Other than the effect of visibility, the notion of common ground, the speaker’s 
assumption and beliefs of shared knowledge between interlocutors, is often invoked to 
demonstrate speakers’ sensitivity to the listener (see section 2.2 for a full definition). 
When speakers believe that there is an established common ground between themselves 
and the listener, it results in a decrease in various aspects of representational gesture such 
as precision, complexity, and informativeness (Gerwing & Bavelas, 2004; Holler & 
Stevens, 2007).  Similarly, when there is a decrease in salience along with an increase in 
common ground, there appears to be less gesturing (Parill, 2010).  Conversely, when 
speakers know that common ground is lacking between themselves and the listener, they 
provide more detailed representational gesture by utilizing higher space in gesturing and 
emphasizing the trajectory of an action for the listener, while they did not alter their 
speech as a function of the state of common ground with the listener (Hillard & Cook, 
2015).   
In terms of a specific type of gesture, Holler & Stevens (2007) showed that 
representational gestures encoding size are expressed differently as a function of common 
ground; that is, when common ground is lacking between interlocutors, size is expressed 
strictly via representational gesture or both speech and representational gesture; in 
contrast, when common ground exists, size information is predominantly conveyed via 
speech and is not expressed via representational gesture. In other words, a modality shift 
away from gesture occurs as a function of common ground.  
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In sum, these studies have shown the production of representational gesture can 
be listener-sensitive, rather than purely planned via an internal mechanism that serves the 
speaker. It appears to be listener-driven, possibly to achieve the goal of communicating 
information, resulting in different gesture rate, size, and form.  Thus, representational 
gestures have also been argued to serve a communicative function to the listener.   
4.1.2.  Listener-modeling and the Repetition Effect in Listener-modeling and the 
Repetition Effect 
Over the course of a dynamic conversation, a representational gesture may reduce 
when it is repeated, demonstrating the Repetition Effect. Gerwing & Bavelas (2004) 
showed that when a new referent is introduced, speakers produce more representational 
gesture than during subsequent mentions of the same event, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. When speakers introduce new information into discourse, representational 
gestures used to accompany the new information have high saliency (i.e., larger in size 
and clearer); in contrast, when speakers refer to information that has been established in 
prior discourse (old information), the repeated representational gestures have low 
saliency (smaller in size and less clear).  Gerwing & Bavelas (2004) account for the 
Repetition Effect with the notion of information status and common ground where new 
information generates more prominent representational gestures while old information 
does not.   
While the idea that new information requires greater communicative weight, 
resulting in hypergesticulation, and old information requires less communicative weight, 
resulting in hypogesticulation, is a plausible one, it might be premature to conclude that 
the new vs. old/given information dichotomy is causing the Repetition Effect. As with 
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Bybee’s (2001, 2002a,) speech production model, gesture reduction could merely be due 
to automatization of a repeated action. That is, any motoric action, be it speech or 
gesture, seems prone to reduction with repetition and not necessarily driven by a change 
in information status. Hence, there appears to be a confound between reduction due to 
information status (new vs. old/given) and reduction due to automatization of a repeated 
action.  Unless this confound is disentangled, possibly with a sequence of listeners, the 
motivation for the reduction remains uncertain.  Moreover, Gerwing & Bavelas’ (2004) 
interpretation of information status still poses a problem identical to the discussion in 
section 3.1.3 in this chapter; that is, it is impossible to determine whether the information 
status of new vs. old/given is relevant for the speaker, for the listener, or for both 
interlocutors.   
Furthermore, the foundation of Gerwing & Bavelas’s (2004) and work is based on 
the notion of common ground, a notion that is consistent with the Listener-modeling 
explanation, for it focuses on the speakers’ assumption of knowledge between them and 
the listener.  However, the data in their study were elicited from an interactive situation 
where interlocutors were free to exchange verbal and non-verbal cues, which is consistent 
with the Listener-interactive explanation. Thus, it is quite possible that it something in the 
interaction that the drove variation in representational gesture found in their data, and not 
common ground per se.  In sum, speakers may not have been modeling the listener 
through common ground; rather, they may have been responding to the listener’s 
behavior, which is more consistent with the Listener-interactive explanation.   
A joint-effort task has also been reported to demonstrate the Repetition Effect.  
Naïve speakers in Hoetjes et al. (2011) were engaged in a director-matcher task of novel 
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GREEBLE creatures, where they find that the subsequent reference to the GREEBLE 
creature is reduced in the rate of representational representational gesture produced.  Note 
that Hoetjes, Koolen, Goudbeek, Krahmer, & Swerts (2015) later reported that repeated 
gestures within the same discourse show a U-shaped distribution where the first reference 
and the third reference of the same referent appear to have the same rate of gesturing, and 
only the second referent shows a reduction. They explain the U-shaped distribution with 
the task effect, where speakers gradually learn to effectively and efficiently gesture 
certain information.  
In their work, they account for the Repetition Effect with the Uniform Density 
Hypothesis (Jager, 2010; Frank & Jager, 2008), which asserts that the expression of 
predictable information, in this case, information that is repeated, is likely to be reduced. 
Again, it is unclear whether the information is presumed predictable to the speaker alone, 
is presumed predictable to the listener by the speaker, or presumed predictable to both 
interlocutors (see section 3.1.3 in this chapter).  
4.1.3.  Listener-modeling and the Repetition Effect in gesture with multiple listeners 
The Repetition Effect has also been found when there is a switch in listeners.  
Jacobs & Garnham (2007) found that the rate and the number of representational gestures 
in repeated referents reduce as a function of the listener’s previous exposure to the 
information.  In one of the conditions of their experiment, they asked speakers to tell and 
retell the same comic strip three times to the same listener; and in another condition, they 
asked speakers to tell and retell the same comic strip to three different listeners. There 
was a significant decrease in gesture rate and number of representational gestures only 
when the comic strip was repeated to the same listener.  
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Elaborating on the work of Jacobs & Garnham (2007), Galati & Brennan (2013) 
also used multiple listeners, more importantly, in a sequence of new and old listeners. 
Their experimental design allows a more substantive comparison between conditions 
since the design creates a mismatch of information between the speaker and the listener 
(see section 5.1 in this chapter for a full discussion). Confirming Jacobs & Garnham’s 
(2007) results on frequency of representational gestures as a function of the listener 
having been exposed to the information before vs. not, Galati & Brennan (2013) found 
that when a story is being retold to a listener who has heard it before, the rate of 
representational gesture decreases. Additionally, speakers perform representational 
gestures that are smaller in size and with less precision.  They also noted that, “after the 
first telling, speakers attenuated both gesture size and iconic precision, but less so if the 
retelling was to a new addressee than to an old addressee” (p. 447). In other words, 
repeated representational gestures reduce as expected; however, the magnitude of 
reduction is dependent of the listener’s previous exposure to the information. They 
interpret the results with the “one-bit” model, which entails listener-modeling (see section 
4.1 in this chapter for the explanation in speech).   
Once again, the results found in Galati & Brennan (2013) and Jacobs & Garnham 
(2007) could be interpreted as having derived from an interaction between interlocutors 
(the Listener-interaction explanation) rather than the speaker’s assumption about the 
listener’s state of knowledge (the Listener-modeling explanation, the “one-bit” model).  
In Galati & Brennan (2013), naïve speakers were able to freely interact with the listeners 
in a narrative task; in fact, participants who played the listener role were told that they 
could “freely comment or ask questions for clarification during the narration” (p. 440).  
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Galati & Brennan (2013) were aware of the possible effects feedback could have 
on production of representational gesture. They examined the effect of listener feedback 
in their study and did not find an effect; hence, they suggested that the speakers’ gestures 
were unlikely to be influenced by the listener’s responses.  However, their analysis may 
not be fine-grained enough to make this conclusion.  Firstly, all audible feedback 
examined was collapsed into a single category, where listener comments, questions, back 
channeling, and laugher were treated the same. This single category may not be sufficient 
to evaluate the effects of the various kinds of feedback found in their data. For example, 
Holler & Wilkin (2011) reported that the rate of representational gesture decreases when 
the verbal feedback is confirmatory; however, the rate remains constant when the verbal 
feedback is clarification, elaboration, or correction.  They also reported that not only the 
rate of representational gesture is dependent of verbal feedback, but the size may vary as 
well.  Therefore, representational gestures may vary quantitatively (in rate) or 
qualitatively (in form) depending on the type of verbal feedback.   
Next, feedback coded in Galati & Brennan (2013) was only auditory (linguistic or 
non-linguistic), leaving all non-verbal feedback unaccounted for.  This poses a problem 
since there is evidence that non-verbal feedback plays a significant role during an 
interaction. For example, Chovil (1991) reported that facial displays accompanying 
speech have multiple functions in discourse (in a conversation) and carry semantic 
content.  Allwood & Carrato (2003) highlighted the relationship between non-verbal 
feedback and verbal feedback in Swedish conversation; importantly, they stress that these 
kinds of feedback have multiple functions in discourse (e.g., reinforcing or 
negative/rejection).  Along the same line, Stave & Pederson (2015) reported that multiple 
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non-verbal cues contribute to triggering  feedback in English, and Pederson (2014) 
emphasized that listener head gestures significantly contribute to the structure of 
conversation in Tamil. In sum, the nature of such fluid exchanges of non-verbal feedback 
should not be overlooked when interlocutors are engaged in an interaction.    
While Jacobs & Garnham (2007) used confederate listeners in their study, they 
were instructed to “listen to the descriptions of the comic strips, but were given no further 
instructions” (p. 295), from which it could be reasonably inferred that interaction between 
interlocutors took place, though it seems less likely that the confederates pretending to 
hear the story afresh will have behaved like genuinely naïve listeners.  Although Jacobs 
& Garnham (2007) found that the Repetition Effect in representational gesture only 
occurs when speakers retell the same story to the same listener, they noted that since their 
confederates were allowed to interact with the speaker, the variation in gesturing could 
have come from differences in individual confederate behavior; in their words, since 
“[the confederates] were not controlled in any way, it is difficult to know if the reactions 
of the [confederates] had any notable effect on the number of gestures produced by the 
speaker” (p. 298). Eventually, Jacobs & Garnham (2007) concluded based on their data 
that speakers are sensitive to the listener.  It would be more precise to interpret that such 
listener-sensitivity to have likely derived from an interaction between interlocutors, rather 
than sensitivity deriving from the speaker modeling the listener’s state of knowledge.    
5. Addressing potential issues in past literature  
 As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the goal of the dissertation is to 
examine speakers’ production across modalities.  In particular, I aim to use the Repetition 
Effect to investigate speakers’ production in speech and in representational gesture, two 
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modes of production that greatly differ in the degree of conventionalization, and 
determine the model that speakers operate by.  The investigation of two modalities allows 
a holistic examination of speakers’ production processes, possibly highlighting features 
of the Repetition Effect that may be modal specific.   
  In this chapter, potential issues in the interpretation of the Repetition Effect in 
both modalities were discussed in detail. The issues can be summarized and grouped into 
two areas: (1) the confound between new and old/given information in the interpretation 
of the Repetition Effect; (2) the confound between the Listener-modeling explanation and 
the Listener-interactive explanation in the interpretation of the Repetition Effect.   
5.1.  Addressing the confound between new and old/given information 
Previous studies that anchored themselves in the notion of information status, 
both in speech and gesture, utilized a single listener in the data (see section 3.1.3. in this 
chapter on speech and 4.1.2. in this chapter on representational gesture).  Having a single 
listener is problematic because it does not allow teasing apart of information status to the 
speaker and the listener.  Table 1 demonstrates that by having only one listener, 
information status overlaps between the speaker and the listener.   
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Table 1: A confound of information status to the speaker and listener 
 
Assumed state of 
Information  
status 
 
Speaker production 
 
Listener exposure 
 
 
New 
 
 
 
 
First production 
 
First 
hearing 
 
Old/given 
 
Subsequent production 
 
Subsequent 
hearing 
 
 
 In the first production, the information is presumed new to both the speaker and 
the listener since the referent is being produced for the first time, as well as being heard 
for the first time.  In the subsequent production, the information is presumed old/given to 
both the speaker and the listener since the referent is being produced for the second time, 
as well has being heard for the second time. Therefore, there exists a confound of to 
whom the state of information applies to: whether it applies to the speaker or to the 
listener.  The more important question, however, is which is responsible for guiding 
speaker behavior?     
 To disentangle such confound, the experiments in this dissertation use multiple 
listeners in a sequence to create a mismatch of information status between speaker 
production and listener exposure.  The sequence used in this dissertation, shown in Table 
2, originally appeared in Galati & Brennan (2013, 2010), where speakers repeat the same 
information three times, twice to listener 1 and once to listener 2.  This sequence is highly 
favored since it teases apart the confound between reduction due to automatization and 
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reduction due to assumed information status, which was discussed in detail in section 
4.1.2. in this chapter .   
 
Table 2: Design of the experiment and the assumed state of knowledge 
 
 
Condition 
 
Speaker production 
 
Listener exposure 
A  
Listener 1 
     
First production 
 
 
 
First hearing B 
Listener 2 
 
 
Subsequent production 
C 
Listener 1 
 
Subsequent hearing 
 
In condition A, speakers present the information for the first time, and the listener 
hears the information for the first time.  Since information is new to both interlocutors, 
condition A to is the baseline. In condition B, speakers repeat the same information for 
the second time; hence, the information is assumed old/given to the speaker. However, 
the same information is assumed new to listener 2 since it is the first time it is being 
heard. In condition C, the speakers repeat the story to listener 1 again.  The information is 
assumed old/given to both interlocutors. Because of the mismatch of information status to 
the speaker and the mismatch of information status to the listener, it can be better 
determined what exactly is guiding speaker behavior.    
5.2.  Addressing the confound between Listener-modeling and Listener-interaction 
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 The Repetition Effect has been accounted for with speakers demonstrating 
sensitivity to the listener (see section 4 in this chapter).  To elaborate, as a result of 
modeling the state of knowledge of the listener, speakers’ production, both in speech and 
gesture, may reduce in repeated referents because the speaker is sensitive to the fact that 
the listener has heard the information before.  In a sense, if the listener has heard it 
before, then the information is considered old/given to the listener and such information 
is conveyed differently from information that is new to the listener.   
Although Galati & Brennan (2013, 2010) used multiple listeners in a sequence to 
rid the information status confound addressed in section 5.1 and proposed the “one-bit” 
model, which is consistent with the Listener-modeling explanation, their study lacked 
control for the interactive aspect in the experiment (see section 4.1.3. in this chapter). To 
conclude that speakers operate by modeling the state of knowledge in their production 
while using data elicited from an interactive setting is a problematic conclusion.   
To tease apart the issue of listener-modeling and listener-interaction, experiments 
in this dissertation use confederate listeners, as opposed to naïve listeners in most of the 
other studies.  In this dissertation, in addition to presenting the speaker with multiple 
listeners in a sequence (see section 5.1. in this chapter), speakers were presented with 
confederate research assistants who provided minimal interaction with the speaker.  
Using controlled confederate listeners can shed light on whether speakers’ production is 
strictly the result of modeling the state of knowledge of the listener and not the result of 
responding to dynamic listener feedback.   
The confederates are native speakers of American English, one male and one 
female, in the same age range as the speakers, who were recruited from an introductory 
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psycholinguistic class for extra credit. Prior to the experiment, they were given explicit 
instruction and training on giving limited feedback to the speakers.  Namely, they 
followed Mol et al’s (2009b) description of a limited feedback, which states that, “We 
prevented true dialogue from happening by instructing [confederates] not to interrupt the 
speaker but to act naturally otherwise. Thus, [confederates] were looking at the speaker 
and gave occasional non-verbal feedback, [confederates] tried to avoid speaking 
themselves” (p. 1571).  Based on this description, confederate listeners provided 
linguistic back channeling, for example saying “uh-huh”, maintained eye contact with the 
speakers, and nodded while listening.  Furthermore, confederates were asked not to 
gesture while engaging with the speakers.   
Gerwing & Bavelas (2013), Bavelas & Healing (2013), and Kuhlen & Brennan 
(2013) have cautioned against the use of confederates in experiments due to the issue of 
ecological validity.  It is true that the use of confederates may alter speakers’ 
performance, thus, providing results that may be less representative; however, 
confederates offer a stricter control that allows teasing apart listener-sensitivity deriving 
from modeling the listener vs. listener-sensitivity deriving from an interaction.  
In addition, the confederates have heard the story many times prior to coming in 
contact in this study, for they were confederates in the pilot data, which have been 
excluded from the analysis.  Hence, condition A, B, and C (see section 5.1 in this 
chapter) are all equally familiar content to the confederates, further minimizing variation 
in their response.  To ensure that there was no apparent difference between condition A 
and B, the videos of the confederates were reviewed; no discernable difference was found 
in their behavior in each condition.   
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CHAPTER II 
THE REPETITION EFFECT ON WORD DURATION 
1.  Introduction 
When people talk, some words are used more than once. The duration of a word is 
longer when it is mentioned for the first time within a discourse than in subsequent 
mentions (Anderson & Howarth, 2002; Aylett & Turk, 2004; Baker & Bradlow, 2009; 
Bell et al., 2009; Fisher & Tokura; 1995; Freeman, 2014; Fowler, 1988; Fowler et al., 
1997; Fowler & Housum, 1987 Galati & Brennan, 2010; Lam & Watson, 2010; 
Pluymaekers et al., 2005; Vajrabhaya & Kapatsinski, 2011).  While the existence of this 
effect of repetition on word duration is by now indisputable, the explanation for it 
remains elusive. In particular, researchers disagree on whether the effect is best thought 
of as subsequent-mention reduction (Bybee, 2001, Bybee, 2002a; Fowler & Housum, 
1987; Galati & Brennan, 2010); first-mention lengthening (Bell et al., 2009); or 
bidirectional durational adjustment (Aylett & Turk, 2006). 
2.  Processing accounts of the Repetition Effect in speech 
Most popular explanations for the Repetition Effect have appealed to processing 
difficulty. Broadly speaking, these processing explanations for the Repetition Effect can 
be categorized into two types: the Listener-modeling explanation and the Listener-neutral 
explanation.  According to Listener-modeling explanation, repetition influences duration 
because speakers are assumed to be sensitive to what the listener already knows or has 
heard before (see section 4.1 in chapter I). In other words, speakers are assumed to track 
the listener’s state of mind and adjust word durations accordingly, making words longer 
when the listener might have trouble understanding them and shorter when no such 
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difficulty is expected (see Lindblom, 1990; Fowler, 1988; Frank & Jaeger, 2008; Galati 
& Brennan, 2010). Note that Baese-Berk & Goldrick (2009), experiment 2, have 
provided evidence that suggests otherwise; in other words, they proposed that modeling 
the listener is unlikely to be the motivation for hyper/hypo articulation of VOT.  
Although the scope of this chapter is on word duration, VOT is a vital phonetic cue that is 
closely related to word duration and should be noted here.  
While the idea that the speaker is running a full-scale simulation of the listener’s 
brain in real time appears implausible, Galati & Brennan (2010) argued that the 
computational costs associated with modeling the listener can be fairly minimal, a single 
bit of information encoding whether the speaker remembers saying the current word to 
the current listener (see Galati & Brennan’s “one-bit” model, section 4 in chapter I). 
Proponents of the Listener-neutral explanation, on the other hand, are skeptical of 
the speaker’s ability to model the listener, or at least of the idea that low-level dynamics 
of articulatory planning and execution, which manifest themselves in word duration 
differences, are affected by such modeling (e.g. Bard et al., 2000; Bard & Aylette, 2005, 
Bell et al., 2009; Bybee, 2002; Bybee 2001). They, therefore, attribute duration 
differences associated with repetition to the effect of repetition on automatization of 
articulatory sequences (Bybee 2002; Bybee, 2001) and repetition priming, where 
previous mention of a word is assumed to result in a sustained increase of the word’s 
activation level (repetition priming), making the word easier to retrieve and pronounce, 
and also reducing its duration by increasing gestural overlap due to greater anticipatory 
activation of upcoming targets (Kapatsinski, 2010; see also Dell et al., 1997). It should be 
highlighted that I do not claim that proponents of the Listener-neutral explanation to 
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reject that idea that speakers are sensitive to the listener (via modeling of the listener to 
be precise).  Recall that the notion of listener-neutrality, as defined in section 2.1 in 
chapter I), only applies to a limited scope; in this case, it applies to word duration.  
Indeed, speakers may show their sensitivity to the listener via other phonetic cues; for 
example, VOT length or intensity, features that are beyond the scope of this dissertation.    
Rather than viewing the Repetition Effect as subsequent mention reduction, Bell 
et al. (2009) argued that it is rather first-mention lengthening, deriving from processing 
difficulties in the speaker’s production system (see section 3 in chapter I).  Despite their 
differences, processing explanations of the Repetition Effect share the assumption that 
duration differences among words are to be explained by how accessible those words are 
in the moment of production, either to the listener or to the speaker. It is this assumption 
that will be questioned and tested in this chapter.   
In this chapter, data suggesting that word duration does not strictly track word 
accessibility for either interlocutor will be presented. Namely, a word that is repeatedly 
mentioned by a speaker to the same listener can lengthen (relative to preceding 
productions) when the word is mentioned for the first time within a re-telling of a story.  
Based on the data in this study and prior data from Vajrabhaya & Kapatsinski (2011) and 
Fowler et al. (1997) (see section 3.1.2. in I), it is strongly suggested that words are 
automatically lengthened when they are mentioned for the first time within a story. An 
exemplar-theoretic account for the results will be provided in the discussion section of 
this chapter. 
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3.  Methods 
3.1. Participants 
Data for this study was obtained from fifteen native speakers of American 
English, consisting of eleven female speakers and four male speakers, who self-reported 
to have normal hearing and speech.  All participants were undergraduate students at the 
University of Oregon who took an introductory psychology or linguistics class that 
required participation in the Psychology/Linguistics Human Subjects Pool (or an 
alternative assignment).  Participants earned research credit for their classes by taking 
part in the experiment.   
 3.2. Procedures 
 Participants were asked to watch a short video clip of a man making a pizza 
dough.  They were allowed to watch the clip as many times as they wished until they 
were certain that they were able to tell other people how a pizza dough is made.  
Participants were also explicitly told that the duration of time they spent watching the clip 
was not being recorded, hence, allowing them to comfortably become familiar to the 
stimulus without time pressure. All participants watched the clip at least twice before 
they informed the researcher that there were ready to describe the process.   
3.3.  Listener type  
Two confederate listeners, one male and one female, were present during the 
experiment (see section 5.2 in chapter I for use of confederates). The confederates were 
undergraduate research assistants who were in the same age range as the participants. 
Generally following Mol et al. (2009b)’s description of limited feedback, confederates’ 
primary task was to provide non-verbal feedback (non-reactive response), which includes 
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nodding and maintaining eye contact with the participants. Confederates limited their 
verbal response to occasionally saying ‘uh-huh’ or ‘yeah’. The order in which the 
listeners were presented to the speakers was counterbalanced across participants. 
Confederates were not informed about the hypothesis until data collection has completed. 
3.4. The sequence of listeners 
The sequence of listeners in this study was originally used by Galati & Brennan 
(2013, 2010).  Participants were asked to describe how a pizza dough is made to the first 
confederate, followed by a ten-minute break, during which participants were asked to 
play a game of Tetris.  When the ten-minute break was over, participants were asked to 
describe the same story to the second confederate, followed by another ten-minute break 
which participants continued the game of Tetris.  Lastly, participants were asked to once 
again tell the same story to the first confederate.  
In order to avoid the implication that the first listener did not understand or follow 
the story on the first telling (which could result in hyperarticulation for clarity), the need 
to retell the story was explained to the participants as resulting from a recording 
equipment malfunction.  Specifically, the researcher told the participant that the 
equipment did not record properly the first time around. After the third telling, 
participants were debriefed and assigned research credit for their participation. In sum, 
participants told the same story three times, twice to the first confederate listener and 
once to the second confederate listener.   
In addition, participants were asked what they thought about the purpose of the 
experiment during debriefing. The majority reported believing that it was a memory task. 
The next most popular response was that the experiment was about how people talk to 
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men vs. women (because the confederates were of different genders). No participant 
reported catching on to the fact that the experiment was about how words are pronounced 
across repetitions (of the words or the story). 
3.5.  Predictions 
Table 3 summarizes the experimental design and corresponding hypotheses.  In 
condition (A), the information is presented and heard for the first time by listener 1; 
hence, the information is new to both the speaker and the listener. Thus, words should be 
as long as they ever are when mentioned for the first time in condition (A). This 
condition is considered to be the baseline.  
In condition (B), the information is presented for the second time by the speaker, 
but it is heard for the first time by the listener (listener 2); hence, the information is 
old/given to the speaker but new to the listener. The Listener-neutral explanation of the 
Repetition Effect predicts that first mention of target words will be reduced in condition 
(B) compared to condition (A). In contrast, the Listener-modeling explanation hypothesis 
predicts no reduction at first mention relative to first mention in condition (A).   
In condition (C), the information is presented for the third time by the speaker and 
is heard for the second time by the listener; hence, the information is old/given to both 
interlocutors. Reduction is expected to occur in this condition, relative to condition (A) 
according to both explanations.  
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Table 3: Design of the experiment  (narrative task in American English) and the 
information status of target words to the speaker and the listener 
 
Condition  
Speaker production 
Listener exposure 
A  
Listener 1 
     
First production 
 
 
 
First hearing B 
Listener 2 
 
 
Subsequent production 
C 
Listener 1 
 
Subsequent hearing 
 
3.6.  Recording  
Participants’ speech was recorded with a Marantz PMD 671 digital recorder.  The 
WAV sound files were analyzed using Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2010). Participants 
were also video-recorded for analysis of representational gesture in chapter III to V.   
3.7.  Measurement  
Speech data was segmented into utterance units: a pause that is equal to or longer 
than 100 milliseconds demarcates a new utterance unit (cf. Kendall, 2013).  Due to the 
nature of the video stimulus described in the speakers’ narrations, which is a man making 
a pizza dough, several content words were used repeatedly across participants and 
conditions. The target words obtained for analysis include: circle, circular, dough, flour, 
knead, knuckle, pizza, pizza dough, rotate, rip, spread, stretch, and surface. If a target 
word was adjacent to disfluencies or formed an utterance on its own, the target word was 
excluded from the analysis. A total of 1,190 tokens were hand measured.   
  55
3.8.  Dependent variables  
There were two dependent variables: duration and f0. To determine the initial 
position of a target word, each target word was hand-measured from the release of the 
syllable initial-consonant until the end of vowel formants or at the final-consonantal 
constriction (cf. Abramson, 2002). Generally, I followed Olive, Greenwood, & 
Coleman’s (1993) methods and guidelines on segmenting static speech sounds (see 
chapter VII in particular). Since many of the target words include /r/, which is difficult to 
measure due to varying formant value in Hz, F3 was used as a cue used to decide where 
the phoneme begins or ends.    
For f0 measurement, the spectrogram range for females was set at 80-250 Hz, 
while the spectrogram range for males was set at 50-180 Hz.  Target words were 
categorized by number of syllables, from one to three. For target words that are 
multisyllabic, the stressed syllable was distinguished from the unstressed syllable; for 
example, the target word CIRcle was segmented into two parts where CIR was coded as 
stressed and cle was coded as unstressed.  The stressed syllable, where the consonant in 
the initial position was excluded, was measured for average f0. Lastly, the average f0 of 
the utterance was also measured.   
3.9.  Analysis 
 Data were analyzed using linear mixed effects models in R (R Development Core 
Team, 2008) with the lme4 package (Bates, 2013). Random intercepts for speakers and 
words and random slopes for all fixed-effects predictors of interest (excluding the speech 
rate covariates) within speakers and words (following Barr et al., 2013) were included. 
To generate p values, the z approximation was used.  Note that since p values-based on 
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the z-statistics has been criticized for being anti-conservative, a model comparison was 
conducted, both with and without the predictors.  The z-based estimates reported below 
show do not indicate a quantitative difference.  Note that results in Barr (2013), Table 5, 
indicate very minimal difference between the two models.  
For the duration analysis, the dependent variable was log word duration. The 
fixed effects predictors were: (1) mention within story (first mention vs. second mention) 
Note that Bell et al. (2009) observed no difference between second and subsequent 
mentions but a significant difference between first and section mention; (2) condition, 
with condition (A) used as the baseline level; and (3) speech rate measured as syllables 
per second within each utterance containing the word of interest (with speech rate before 
the word and speech rate after the word entered as separate predictors in analyzing 
utterance-medial durations).  
The f0 analysis consists of two dependent variables: mean f0 of the stressed 
syllable of the target word and the difference between maximum and minimum f0 within 
the target word (f0 range within the target word). Control predictors were: (1) Mean f0 
within the utterance containing the target word and (2) Speaker gender. Mention and 
condition were also entered as fixed-effects predictors, as in the duration analysis. 
4.  Results 
4.1.  Word duration  
Figure 4 shows word duration as a function of repetition within story (‘Mention’) 
across the three story repetitions (‘Condition’: First telling of the story to the first listener 
= ‘A’; First telling of the story to the second listener = ‘B’; Second telling of the story to 
the first listener = ‘C’) for utterance-medial word tokens.  There is a clear effect of 
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repetition within story (confirmed to be significant using mixed-effects modeling, as 
shown in Table 5 below) with no effect of repetition across stories. In addition, there is an 
effect of speech rate in the expected direction. 
 
Figure 4: Word duration in medial position boxplot. Notches show 95% confidence 
intervals for the median. 
 
 
Results remain unchanged if boundary-adjacent instances are included. Including 
final occurrences, there is still a significant effect of Repetition within story (b = -.021, 
se(b) = .007, t = -2.86, p = .004) and Speech rate (b = -.003, se(b) = .001, t = -2.68, p = 
.007) in addition to a significant effect of position within utterance (b = -.05, se(b) = .006, 
t = -8.10, p<.0001).   
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Table 4: Fixed-effects coefficient estimates from a mixed-effects model with maximal 
random effects structure examining the effect of repetition on duration. 
 
b se(b) t p 
(Intercept) .650348 .023968 27.134 <.0001 
Repetition within story -.02719 .008065 -3.372 .0007 
Condition=B -.01211 .008454 -1.432 .15 
Condition=C -.01158 0.0108 -1.072 .28 
Speech rate before -.0051 .001364 -3.741 .0002 
Speech rate after -.00058 .000584 -0.996 .32 
 
This effect of position is responsible for the apparently lower median for initial 
mentions in Condition B in Figure 5: if position is not included in the model, words in 
Condition B are significantly shorter than those in Condition A. When initial instances 
are included, there is again a significant effect of Repetition within story (b = -.026, se(b) 
=  .008, t = -3.36, p = .0008), with all other effects failing to reach significance (|t| < 1). 
Comparison of subsequent mentions of a word in StoryN to the first mentions of 
the same word in StoryN+1 reveals a significant lengthening effect across the story 
boundary, as shown in Table 6. When words that have previously mentioned are 
mentioned for the first time within a story, they are longer than at previous mention. The 
effect of story boundary remains significant if word occurrences adjacent to utterance 
boundaries are included: b = .022, se(b) = .008, t =   2.80, p = .005 including utterance-
initial words, b = .021, se(b) = .008, t =   2.60, p = .009 including utterance-final ones). 
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Table 5: Fixed-effects coefficient estimates from a mixed-effects model with maximal 
random effects structure examining the effect of story boundaries on duration. 
 
b se(b) t p 
(Intercept) .631083 .026738 23.602 <.0001 
Repetition across story boundary .019365 .008024 2.414 .016 
Speech rate before -.00351 .001598 -2.199 .028 
Speech rate after -.0055 .00239 -2.302 .021 
 
Replicating Bell et al., (2009)’s corpus data, there was no significant duration 
difference between second and subsequent mentions: |t|<1 for medial words, non-final 
words and non-initial words. There is also no significant effect of mention if mention is 
entered as a continuous predictor if first mentions are excluded (|t| < 1). 
4.2.  Fundamental frequency (f0) 
As shown in Table 6 and Table 7, there were no significant effects of repetition 
within story or condition on either of the two variables. The pitch of the stressed syllable 
of the target word is very well predict ed by average pitch across the utterance. While it is 
slightly (~24 Hz) higher than average for the utterance, consistent with the fact that this 
syllable may sometimes bear an accent, pitch height is not affected by repetition within or 
across stories. The within-word pitch range measure (M=54 Hz) appears to be affected 
only by speaker gender, with men having lower pitch ranges.  
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Table 6: Fixed-effects coefficient estimates from a mixed-effects model with maximal 
random effects structure examining the effect of repetition on mean f0 of the stressed 
syllable of the target word 
b se(b) t p 
(Intercept) 24.3987 10.477 2.329 .020 
Repetition within story 3.1269 3.6184 .864 .387 
Condition = B 4.5383 3.0796 1.474 .141 
Condition = C 2.5152 11.706 .215 .830 
Gender = Male -7.3266 4.8922 -1.498 .134 
Mean f0 .8243 .0521 15.823 <.05 
 
Table 7: Fixed-effects coefficient estimates from a mixed-effects model with maximal 
random effects structure examining the effect of repetition on f0 range within the target 
word.   
b se(b) t p 
(Intercept) 53.73806 17.05215 3.151 .002 
Repetition within story -7.2339 8.36464 -.865 .387 
Condition = B -4.60099 4.44303 -1.036 .300 
Condition = C -3.5883 7.467373 -.481 .631 
Gender = Male -22.9008 6.752733 -3.391 .0007 
Mean utterance f0 -.00838 .07625 -.11 0.912 
 
5.  Preliminary discussion 
Results of the experiment show initial mentions of target word are reliably longer 
than subsequent mentions within the same telling of the same story. Furthermore, second 
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mentions do not differ in duration from subsequent mentions, suggesting that it is the first 
mention that is unique in duration (Bell et al., 2009). When a new story starts, regardless 
of whether the listener has heard the story before, word duration resets. In sum, word 
duration reduces within story but lengthens back to its original, first-mention duration 
when speakers retell the story. Fundamental frequency (f0), on the other hand, shows no 
statistically significant results.   
Lack of duration reduction across stories accompanied by significant reduction 
within stories is consistent with prior work. Despite differing conclusions, neither Fowler 
et al. (1997), nor Bard et al., (2000, Experiment 1), nor Galati & Brennan (2010) found a 
significant decrease in word durations across stories (for words mentioned for the first 
time within a story). While Galati & Brennan (2010) concluded that words are reduced 
across stories when a story is repeated to the same listener, there was no significant effect 
of repetition across stories on duration in their data (minF’ = .01 for story repetition 
within listener in Table 2). Thus, their conclusion is based entirely on a numerical effect 
of story repetition within listener on clarity ratings of words mentioned for the first time 
within a story, which is not conventionally significant (minF’ (1,24) = 3.15, p = .08) 
(Galati & Brennan, 2010, p.12). The effect of story repetition across listeners is in the 
unexpected direction with p = .12.  
In contrast to the lack of significant across-story duration differences, Bard et al. 
(2000) in experiments 2-4, Bell et al. (2009), Fowler & Housum (1987), and Fowler et al. 
(1997) found a significant difference in duration between first and subsequent repetitions 
within coherent stretches of discourse. Note that Galati & Brennan (2010) did not report 
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durations of subsequent repetitions within a story. The results here are not qualitatively 
changed if only first mentions within a story are analyzed. 
In addition to replicating within-story reductions in duration, this study 
documents that words lengthen relative to preceding productions by the same speaker 
when they are mentioned for the first time within a new story. These results hold true 
even though words mentioned for the first time within a story generally do not occur in 
story-initial sentences that have been argued to be harder to process (Haberlandt et al., 
1980; den Uyl & van Oostendorp, 1980) (see section 3.1.2. in chapter I for comparison).  
In fact, the first mention of a word in the data occurs on average 42 seconds into the 
story.  
Researchers in the Listener-neutral tradition have been concerned that modeling 
of the listener is a resource-demanding process that, if carried out in full detail in real 
time, should make conversation impossible. To alleviate this burden, several researchers 
in the Speaker-neutral tradition have proposed that the speaker can default to assuming 
that the listener’s state of mind is the same as the speaker’s (e.g. Bard et al., 2000; Clark 
& Marshall, 1981; Horton & Keysar, 1996).  In addition to this kind of egocentric 
processing, the cognitive burden of listener modeling can also be reduced by gradual 
incorporation of the ‘generic’ behavior of the listener into the conventions of the 
language, either over historical time at the level of the speech community or over the 
course of first language development within the individual. An account of this 
conventionalization process for first-mention lengthening is highly plausible.   
The Exemplar-based models of the lexicon ascribe differences to storage of 
phonetically detailed production exemplars of words and phrases (e.g. Bybee 2002b; 
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Pierrehumbert, 2001, 2006). The category of possible realizations of a word is 
represented by the entire set of previously experienced realizations; each is associated 
with information about the discourse context in which it was produced (Pierrehumbert, 
2001, 2006).  
Joint activation of a word and a discourse context leads to activation of all 
exemplars of the activated word that were experienced perceptually or produced 
articulatorily in the activated discourse context, and in addition, weaker activation of 
other exemplars of the same word. As such, the activated exemplars influence the 
production target to the extent that they are activated (Pierrehumbert, 2001). In the 
current case, when a word is said for the first time, it falls under one exemplar category; 
whereas, when the same word is repeated within the same discourse, it falls under another 
exemplar category. The exemplar categories (first vs. subsequent mention) are 
independent; importantly, they are argued to be driven by structure of the discourse, not 
by accessibility of the lexical item.   
The cornerstone of the Exemplar Model is rooted in one’s experience. It could be 
the case that initially, speakers may lengthen the first mention of a word (hyperarticulate) 
to avoid misunderstanding (Lindblom, 1990); however, if the goal usually arises, and 
thus a strategy is used in a specific linguistic environment (here, the first time a word is 
said), the strategy eventually becomes associated with that environment (see also Bybee, 
2006).  
It is possible that over time, the strategy becomes part of the convention, a part of 
the grammar, starting from something that speakers once upon a time chose to do in order 
to accomplish a specific goal (i.e., of avoiding misunderstanding): it becomes something 
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that the speakers cannot help but do in a specific discourse/linguistic environment. 
Production of the erstwhile strategy in the context becomes automatized for the speaker; 
thus, at this point, it is an automatized and a conventionalized act.   
The conventionalization of goal-driven production strategies into discourse 
structure is analogous to the generalization of phonetic pressures into the 
conventionalized patterns of phonology. For example, there is a phonetic motivation for 
devoicing of stops like /b/, /d/, /g/ in utterance-final, pre-pausal position: vocal folds, 
which need to be brought together to produce voicing, are open during pauses. Hence, the 
speaker preparing to pause may stop voicing early in anticipation. At the same time, 
subglottal pressure decreases throughout the utterance, making voicing (vibration of the 
vocal folds due to the passage of air between them) hard to maintain at the ends of long 
utterances (see Myers & Padgett, in press, for a review of the literature). There is no 
phonetic motivation for devoicing at the ends of utterance-initial words before vowels (as 
in /bed of/), yet in many languages (e.g., German and Russian), final devoicing occurs at 
the ends of all words, even before vowels. This is a prime case of a generalization that 
extends beyond the context where it was originally motivated.  
Experimental work by Myers & Padgett (2014) shows that language learners are 
predisposed to generalize patterns from the utterance-final context to all word-final 
contexts. Once generalization occurs, the process is said to be phonological, and therefore 
conventionalized (phonology being conventionalized phonetics, e.g. Pierrehumbert, 
2001). In the same way, that first mention is always longer than the latter could very well 
have been generalized beyond the context in which it is motivated, in this case, to avoid 
misunderstanding. This process of domain generalization (Myers & Padgett, 2014) 
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appears to be a sign of conventionalization: as a linguistic behavior becomes 
conventionalized, it becomes associated with smaller and smaller units (or domains). 
It is profitable to distinguish between lexical and postlexical ‘phonetic 
implementation’ and the influences on word duration (see also Plug, 2005). Postlexical 
influences can be described as ‘true’ lengthening or shortening which can in turn be 
categorized into those influences affecting planning and those affecting execution. 
Planning-stage influences operate on a previously selected form and stretch or compress 
it by parametric adjustment. These include at least lengthening for the purposes of buying 
time for planning or accessing upcoming material (e.g. Schnadt, 2009), shortening of 
replacements in repair (Plug & Carter 2013; O’Shaughnessy, 1995), durational 
adjustments based on contextual predictability (e.g. Baker & Bradlow 2009; Jurafsky, 
Bell, Gregory, & Raymond, 2001), gestural alignment changes associated with 
differences in speech rate (Browman & Goldstein, 1990; Davidson, 2006), speech style 
(Smiljanić & Bradlow, 2009; Uchanski, 2008), and phrase-or utterance-level prosodic 
prominence (Aylett & Turk, 2006; Aylett & Turk, 2004). Execution-stage influences 
include automatization of execution of frequent words (Kapatsinski, 2010) as well as 
premature anticipatory activation of upcoming gestural targets resulting in unplanned 
anticipatory coarticulation (Farnetani & Recasens, 1999). Previous accounts of the 
Repetition Effect have assumed a postlexical locus for the psychological process that 
leads to the observed differences in duration.  
In contrast, it could be argued that the effect should be at least partially attributed 
to lexical form selection, akin to selecting a full noun phrase vs. a pronoun to refer to a 
discourse referent (see Fowler et al., 1997 for a direct comparison of the two processes).   
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Additional evidence for the use of lexically-stored phonetic detail comes from studies 
documenting that words that tend to occur in reduction-favoring contexts are heavily 
prone to reduction even when used outside of these contexts (Bybee, 2002a; Kapatsinski, 
submitted; Raymond & Brown, 2012; Schweitzer, 2010; though cf. Cohen-Goldberg, 
2015).  
The viability of this kind of lexical selection mechanism for the Repetition Effect 
is suggested by Bell et al.’s (2009) and Baker & Bradlow’s (2009) finding that the 
magnitude of the Repetition Effect is larger for frequent words. As proposed by Bybee 
(1988), because of their high individual frequency, each contextual variant of a frequent 
word can be processed relatively independently of the other variants. Their productions 
will then be driven more by their own exemplars than by the exemplars associated with 
the same word used in other contexts or those of the sublexical units composing the word.  
As a result, contextual variants of frequent words are expected to be less similar than 
contextual variants of rare words, resulting in greater variability among realizations of 
frequent words (see also Schweitzer & Möbius (2004) and Walsh, Möbius, Wade, & 
Schütze (2010)).   
It is possible that when a word is mentioned for the first time within a discourse, it 
is much less accessible to both the speaker and the listener. Thus, words produced in this 
context are expected to be relatively long due to postlexical lengthening processes. 
Similarly to Galati & Brennan (2010), it can be argued that speakers keep track of 
whether a word is mentioned for the first time in a discourse episode, which then makes 
this ‘first-mention’ context available for being stored in memory with the produced 
exemplar of the word. As a result, the ‘first-mention’ context is, therefore, populated by 
  67
relatively long word exemplars. Joint activation of the ‘first-mention’ context and a word 
is then expected to result in activation of relatively long exemplars of that word even 
when the word is easily accessible to both the speaker and the hearer. 
6.  Preliminary conclusions 
With the exception of Fowler et al. (1997), past literature has examined the effect 
of repetition on word duration as an online process of reduction or, less commonly, 
lengthening (Bell et al., 2009) driven by in-the-moment accessibility of the word’s 
referent to either the speaker or the listener. Results in this chapter show that speakers’ 
production of words that are mentioned for the first time within a coherent stretch of 
discourse (‘story’) are longer than subsequent mentions of the same word within that 
story or preceding mentions of the word within the preceding telling of the same story. 
This first-mention lengthening occurs even if the word has previously mentioned for the 
same listener and is therefore easily accessible to both speaker and listener; therefore, 
first-mention lengthening has a significant offline component, modeled here as storage 
and retrieval of richly-specified exemplars associated with various discourse contexts (cf. 
Pierrehumbert, 2006).  
This account makes sense of the relative insensitivity of duration to online 
information status differences, as documented in Bard et al., (2000), Lam & Watson 
(2010), and the present results. It also successfully accounts for the finding that first-
mention lengthening is greater in magnitude for high-frequency words (Baker & 
Bradlow, 2009; Bell et al., 2009) using mechanisms already well-established for 
describing diachronic lexical splits and ‘special reduction’ (Bybee, 1988; Gahl, 2008).  
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CHAPTER III 
THE REPETITION EFFECT WITH ABSOLUTE SIZE REPRESENTATIONAL 
GESTURE 
1.   Introduction  
In chapter II, the Repetition Effect in speech was examined.  Unlike speech, 
which is highly conventionalized, representational gestures are not at all conventionalized 
(see McNeill’s Continuum 3, section 2.5 in chapter I) and may behave differently from 
speech when they are repeated.  Although they are unconventional by definition, they are 
not homogenous in the function they serve.  Approaching the examination of 
representational gestures functionally allows a more fine-grained categorization, which 
could reveal the role they play in discourse.   
In this chapter, representational gestures that depict an absolute size, which will 
be referred to as absolute size representational gesture, will be examined. I will 
demonstrate that although absolute size representational gestures may not be 
conventionalized by definition, they are resistant to reduction, regardless of the model 
that speakers operate by, due to the necessary semantic content they carry.  In short, they 
function to encode size information, thus, cannot be spatially reduced in order to preserve 
the semantic content of size.   
2.  The form and function of an absolute size representational gesture  
When speakers refer to an object’s size, they can convey the message verbally, for 
instance, by saying that an object is one foot long or that an object is three inches wide. 
Speech alone, without a doubt, is sufficient to communicate size information.  However, 
speech is not the only way speakers can convey size information; there are instances 
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when speakers perform an absolute size representational gesture co-verbally. In cases 
such as these, speech alone becomes insufficient to communicate size information 
because the essential semantic content (the size of the object) is entirely packaged in the 
absolute size representational gesture, not in speech. Strictly speaking, both modalities 
must operate in a synchronized fashion for the semantic content to unfold.  Figure 5 and 6 
demonstrate an example.   
 
Figure 5: First example of an absolute size representational gesture 
 
 
 
In Figure 5, while the speaker says I caught a fish this big, she also performs an 
absolute representational gesture that depicts the fish’s size.  The verbal description this 
big is incomplete without the accompanying absolute size representational gesture. That 
is, if she were to say this big without gesturing, the message is incomplete since size 
information has not been encoded (and of course, cannot not be decoded).   Along the 
same rationale, if the speaker gestures without the verbal counterpart this big, the 
message is incomplete since the viewer cannot be certain that the representational gesture 
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does not have other interpretations.  Note that any representational gesture is 
unconventionalized by definition and cannot standalone, unlike an emblem or a sign in 
ASL, for instance (see section 2.5 in chapter I); speech is always required for a complete 
message to unfold.  
 
Figure 6: Second example of an absolute size representational gesture 
 
 
 
 
Suppose that the speaker says I caught a fish this big again, but this time, the 
absolute size representational gesture appears as in Figure 6, instead of Figure 5.   
Despite the verbal description being identical, the message regarding size is different.  In 
other words, the fish that the speaker referred to in Figure 6 is clearly not the same as the 
fish that was described in Figure 5; the fish in Figure 6 is a much smaller than the fish in 
Figure 5.   
These two examples emphasize the fact size information is strictly encoded in the 
absolute size representational gesture: the representational gesture itself reflects the size 
of the object being described.  Since size information is solely embedded in the gesture, 
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the Repetition Effect should have no impact when absolute size representational gestures 
are repeated, regardless of the speaker’s assumption of the state of knowledge of the 
listener.  
3.  Objective of this chapter  
 The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that absolute size representational 
gestures do not undergo reduction in repetition due to the essential and necessary 
semantic content they carry.  When speakers make a reference to an object’s size in the 
retellings, absolute size representational gestures will not reduce due to automatization 
(the Listener-neutral explanation, see section 3.2.2 in chapter I) nor will they reduce due 
to the speakers’ assumed state of knowledge of the listener (Listener-modeling 
explanation, see section 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 in chapter I).  In sum, absolute size 
representational gestures will remain constant in repetitions because of the function they 
serve in encoding size information.   
3.  Methods 
3.1.  Participants  
 Speakers in this study were recruited from the University of Oregon Psychology 
and Linguistics Human Subject Pool, where they earn one research credit for 
participating in the experiment.  They were undergraduate students, consisting of seven 
males and sixteen females who self-reported American English as their native language.  
All twenty-three speakers reported having normal speech and hearing. These participants 
are the same participants in chapter II, with right additional participants who were 
recruited after analysis in of word duration had completed.  
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3.2. The stimulus 
The stimulus is a short video clip, approximately two minutes in length, of a man 
making a pizza dough and explaining the process concurrently. As the man works the 
dough, the size of the dough expands into a larger size.  See Figure 7 for an example.  
 
Figure 7: The dough expanding in size 
 
 
 
Note that in the stimulus, the man does not describe the size of the dough 
verbally.  In other words, he does not refer to the size of the dough while performing the 
task (e.g., the dough is 6 inches in diameter).  Thus, the stimulus has a potential in 
eliciting absolute size representational gestures if participants find that dough size is 
essential information to include in the description.   
3.3. Recording  
All recordings were performed without the presence of the researcher. Speakers 
were video-recorded during the experiment, where the original MTS files were converted 
to MP4 files before transcription and coding.  Additionally, speakers were also audio-
recorded with a Marantz PMD 671 since this is the same set of data used in chapter II.   
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3.4. Procedures 
 Speakers were told that they would be watching a short video clip of a cooking 
show.  Their goal was to become familiar with the content of the clip so that they could 
explain it to other undergraduate students who were scheduled for a related experiment. 
They were told that the amount of time spent watching the stimulus was not being 
recorded (and it was not) and that they could replay the clip as many times as they 
wished. They watched the stimulus at least twice on a computer screen while alone.  
Once they felt that they have a good grasp of the material, they informed the researcher 
who was waiting in a room nearby.    
 Speakers explained how a pizza dough is made three times, twice to listener 1, 
and once to listener 2 (see the sequence of listeners in Table 2 and the rationale of this 
sequence in section 5.1 in chapter I). Between each telling, there was a ten-minute break 
where speakers were asked to play a game of Tetris on the computer by themselves. 
These extended breaks are a conservative choice since they are intended to minimize 
reduction due to repetition priming from the previous telling.  All listeners were 
confederate listeners who were counter-balanced across speakers (see the use of 
confederates in section 5.2. in chapter I).   
Speakers were debriefed and were also asked what they thought the experiment 
was about; two most common responses were either it was a memory task or it was on 
how people talk to men vs. women since the listeners were of both genders and the study 
was conducted in a sociolinguistics lab. They did not suspect it was a gesture study.   
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3.5.  Predictions for absolute size representational gestures 
All absolute size representational gestures across all conditions (A, B, and C) are 
predicted to be identical in size due to the rich-semantic content they carry. Reduction 
due to automatization and assumed state of knowledge of information for the speaker 
and/or for the listener should have no effect on absolute size representational gestures in 
repetition.   
3.6.  Coding 
First, speech sound was transcribed and segmented into intonation phrases 
independent of the video.  In this study, a pause that exceeds 100 milliseconds designates 
a new intonation phrase (cf. Kendall, 2013).  Events of an absolute size representational 
gesture selected for analysis must occur across all three trials. This is because it is 
impossible to determine whether an omission is due to the speaker simply forgetting to 
mention the event or it could have been because the speaker omitted the event due to an 
assumption about the state of knowledge of the listener.    
Once all data points of interests have been extracted, the conditions were omitted 
for trial-blindness as preparation for coding. The verbal description that coincides with an 
absolute size representational gesture includes but is not limited to: this large, this size, 
and yea big. A total of five triplets were converted into a still picture.  I examined each 
triplet qualitatively, comparing the distance from the left hand to the right hand across all 
tellings.  If the two hands are joined, then the space created in between two arms is 
examined.   
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4.  Results 
 Most participants did not include size information in the description across three 
tellings; however, five participants did include size information in their description across 
three tellings.  Although triplets of absolute size representational gesture are few and far 
between in the data, mostly because they did not consistently occur across all three 
conditions, the triplets can be examined qualitatively.   
Results show that in all five triplets captured, when speakers refer to the size of 
the dough across three tellings, the spatial distance from the left hand to the right hand or 
the space between the two arms remains constant, thus, reflecting the same semantic 
content of size in repetitions.  In the five cases are exhibited below, absolute size 
representational gestures do not reduce in size in repetitions, whether the information is 
being repeated to a new listener (condition B) or to a listener who has heard the 
description before (condition C).  For each participant, the leftmost photo is the first 
telling (condition A, baseline), the middle photo is the second telling (condition B, to a 
new listener), and the rightmost photo is the third telling (condition C, to the first listener 
again). 
 
Figure 8: Participant 4 demonstrating the size of the dough 
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In the first telling, participant 4 said once it’s about this big; in the second telling, 
she said once it’s about, like, yea big; in the third telling, she said once it’s about, like, 
dunno, like, this big.  Notice that the space between her hands was roughly the same 
across all three trials.  
 
Figure 9: Participant 10 demonstrating the size of the dough 
 
 
The verbal description across three tellings by participant 10 was once it’s, like, 
this big.  Again, notice that the space between her hands was identical across all three 
trials; thus, the size of the dough remained constant.  It is interesting to note that for this 
participant, the verbal description in other parts (parts that do not refer to size) in the 
description across three trials varied, but the verbal description indicating size, along with 
the absolute size representational gestures, were identical.   
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Figure 10: Participant 15 demonstrating the size of the dough 
 
 
 
In the first telling, participant 15 said once it’s gets to about this size; in the 
second telling, she said once it gets to a certain size; in the third telling, she said when it 
gets to about this size. The size of the dough, as exhibited via absolute size 
representational gesture, remained constant. 
 
Figure 11: Participant 18 demonstrating the size of the dough 
 
 
In the first telling, participant 18 said once it’s gets to be about, I say, about this 
size; in the second telling, she said so maybe, like, about this size; in the third telling, she 
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said until you reach about, like, that size.  Unlike the two previous examples, both hands 
are joined together to exhibit the size of the dough.  The area between her arms appeared 
identical across all three trials; hence, the size of the dough remained constant.  
 
Figure 12: Participant 21 demonstrating the size of the dough 
 
 
In the first telling, participant 21 said pizza that’s about this big; in the second 
telling, she said this, like, big of a blob, I guess; in the third telling, she said pizza dough 
about this big.  Again, the size of the dough, as exhibited via absolute size 
representational gesture, remained constant. 
 
Figure 13: Participant 20 demonstrating the size of the dough 
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Unlike the previous five cases, participant 20, as shown in Figure 13, used a 
different kind verbal description.  In the first telling, participant 20 said he [man in the 
video clip] had it to, uh, plateish-size; in the second telling, he said he  [man in the video 
clip] had it at about plate-size; in the third telling, he said he’s  [man in the video clip] 
gotten to about a plate-size.   
A case such as this could be construed as exhibiting an absolute size 
representational gesture, in the sense that the participant was gesturing the size of the 
dough, indicating how big plateish size and plate-size is. Although similar, this instance 
is not the same as the rest of the cases presented earlier (from Figure 8 to Figure 12) since 
the verbal description can stand alone without the absolute size representational gesture 
for the semantic content to unfold. That is, plateish-size and plate-size already pack some 
semantic content (i.e., a plate is assumed to be of a certain size).  This is in contrast to 
saying this big or that size without the accompanying absolute size representational 
gesture, where size information is entirely absent.  In sum, although this instance is not 
qualified as an absolute size representational gesture, it has a similar characteristic in 
being resistant to reduction in repetition.  It remained constant throughout the repetitions, 
even when the verbal counterpart already exhibits some semantic content of size.  
5.  Preliminary discussion 
 Results in this chapter show that an absolute size representational gesture is 
resistant to reduction in repetition from automatization (Listener-neutral explanation) or 
speakers’ assumption of the state of knowledge of the listener (Listener-modeling 
explanation). Such resistance to reduction, I argue, is due to the rich semantic content that 
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is packaged in the absolute size representational gesture itself.  An absolute size 
representational gesture cannot be reduced, despite the number of repetitions or as a 
result of the speaker’s assumed state of knowledge of the listener, if the speaker is being 
truthful and precise in communicating size information.    
The qualitative findings in this chapter raise an important question on how 
representational gestures should be approached. Indeed, all representational gestures are 
unconventionalized by definition (section 2.5 in chapter I); however, they vary in the 
function they serve; thus, they should not be viewed and treated as a one-size-fits all 
phenomenon.  I argue that some kinds of representational gestures have more 
communicative intention than others; in this case, absolute size representational gestures 
have a high communicative intention since size information is strictly packaged in 
gesturing rather than in speech.  Since they bear such rich semantic content, they cannot 
not undergo reduction in repetition since any reduction will alter message.   In contrast, 
other kinds of representational gestures may not be as communicatively-intended and 
may be more prone to reduction in repetition; these kinds will be discussed in detail in 
chapter IV and chapter V.   
Other studies that gesturing plays a prominent role in conveying size information.  
Holler & Stevens (2007) reported that the modality, which encodes size information is 
dependent of the speaker’s assumption of the listener’s state of knowledge (i.e., common 
ground).  That is, when size information is new information, it is carried out via 
representational gesture alone or it is carried out via representational gesture and speech; 
in contrast, if size information is old information, it is carried out via speech alone.  
Beattie & Shovelton (2005) revealed that when size is considered important information, 
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it is carried out via gesturing; conversely, when size information is not considered 
important information, it is carried out via speech.   
Although these two studies did not examine absolute size representational 
gestures (i.e., the representational gestures were not accompanied by the same kind of 
verbal counterpart), they, too coincide with the findings in this chapter. That is, size 
information can be carried out via gesturing, be it new information that contains size or 
important information that contains size.  In the current case of an absolute size 
representational gesture, the representational gesture itself depicts the size of the object 
and does not reduce spatially in repetition. Perhaps, gestures that convey size should be a 
class of gestures by itself, a class that has a tendency to be highly communicative, which 
consists of different sub-types that are categorized by form and function.   
6.  Preliminary conclusions 
 In this section, I have shown that absolute size representational gestures do not 
reduce in repetition.  The primary function of absolute size representational gestures is to 
convey size message, thus, they cannot be reduced in repetition.  Functionally speaking, 
absolute size representational gestures have a high communicative intention, possibly 
more than other kinds of representational gesture, especially those that are not concerned 
with size information.   
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CHAPTER IV 
THE REPETITION EFFECT ON MIMETIC REPRESENTATIONAL GESTURE 
1.  Introduction 
Chapter III discussed a particular kind of representational gesture that is resistant 
to reduction in repetition.  That is, absolute size representational gestures do not reduce 
under repetition since they function to carry necessary semantic content.  In this chapter, 
mimetic representational gestures, a representational gesture that exhibits an action will 
be examined. Although both kinds of representational gestures are unconventionalized, 
they behave differently when they are repeated.   
The primary objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that unlike absolute size 
representational gestures, which do not undergo reduction in repetition, mimetic 
representational gestures undergo reduction in repetition.  I will demonstrate that 
reduction in repetition in mimetic representational gestures is due to automatization 
(Listener-neutral explanation, section 3.2.2 in chapter I); it is not due to the speakers’ 
sensitivity to the state of knowledge of the listener (Listener-modeling explanation, 
section 4.1.3 in chapter I).  Therefore, I argue that mimetic representational gestures 
function to serve the speaker in cognitively, rather than having a communicative function.   
2.  Function of mimetic representational gestures  
 Recall the rabbit hopping out of the room example in section 2.5 (Figure 2) in 
chapter I.  The speaker says the rabbit is hopping out of the room, while performing a 
representational gesture. Now, consider the speaker saying the rabbit is hopping out of 
the room, but the motoric commitment and effort used in gesturing is reduced from the 
original (as shown in Figure 2).   
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Figure 14: “The rabbit hopping out the room” gestured with reduced motoric 
commitment and effort 
 
Regardless of the reduced motoric commitment and effort invested by the 
speaker, the semantic content is still intact, unlike the case of an absolute size 
representational gesture (see chapter III). To elaborate, if the index finger and the middle 
finger, representing the rabbit, are flimsy, the verbal counterpart of rabbit still functions 
to indicate the kind of animal being talked about.  If the arch in hopping action is smaller, 
the verbal counterpart of hopping functions to indicate the kind of motion being 
performed.  Lastly, if the trajectory of out of the room is not as extended, the verbal 
counterpart of out of the room functions to indicate the direction the rabbit is going. The 
redundancy of message in both modalities is high; there is much overlapping between 
content reflected in speech and content reflected in gesturing.   
 A mimetic representational gesture is a gesture that depicts an action, performed 
along side speech. This is not a pantomime, so speech is a vital component.  In Figure 14, 
the mimetic representational gesture is the arch motion that represents the action of the 
rabbit hopping.  Compare to Figure 2 and Figure 14, a pantomime would probably exhibit 
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a whole body movement of hopping, where the rabbit is embodied as the person 
performing the hopping action.   
Another example of a mimetic representational gesture is demonstrated in Figure 
15.  In this example, only the action alone is depicted; hence, it purely demonstrates a 
mimetic representational gesture.  
 
Figure 15: “I dropped something” mimetic representational gesture 
 
 
 
In this example, the speaker says I dropped something while performing a 
mimetic representational gesture. Similar to the rabbit hopping out of the room example, 
there is high redundancy of semantic content in speech and in gesturing.  Should the 
speaker perform a reduced mimetic representational gesture, using less motoric 
commitment and effort, of dropping an object or the speaker does not perform a mimetic 
representational gesture at all, the message should be comprehensible since all the 
semantic content necessary is already packaged in speech. As a result, the communicative 
intention of a mimetic representational gesture is presumably low due to the redundancy.   
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3.  Objective of this chapter  
The object of this chapter is to demonstrate that mimetic representational gestures 
undergo reduction in repetition.  I will show that speakers invest in less and less motoric 
commitment and effort as a function of repetition, regardless of their assumed state of 
knowledge of the listener.  Therefore, I argue that mimetic representational gestures are 
for the speaker, rather than bearing a communicative intention.   
4.  Methods 
4.1.  Participants 
Speakers in this study were recruited from the University of Oregon Psychology 
and Linguistics Human Subject Pool, where they earn one research credit for 
participating in the experiment.  They were undergraduate students, consisting of seven 
males and sixteen females who self-reported American English as their native language.  
All twenty-three speakers reported having normal speech and hearing.  These are the 
same participants and same set of data presented in chapter II (Repetition Effect in 
speech) and chapter III (Repetition Effect in absolute size representational gesture).   
4.2. The stimulus 
The stimulus is a short video clip, approximately two minutes in length, of a man 
making a pizza dough and explaining the process concurrently.  It is the same stimulus in 
chapter II and chapter III. Figure 16 shows an excerpt of the man in the video stretching 
the pizza dough. 
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Figure 16: The man stretching the dough 
 
 
 
This particular stimulus was selected since it has a high potential in eliciting 
mimetic representational gesture since it is extremely action-oriented.  In this example, 
the man in the clip is working the dough, stretching it in a circular motion.  When 
speakers explain this process, they are more likely to demonstrate each step gesturally 
along with speech, demonstrating how something is done in detail.  If these mimetic 
representational gestures carry semantic content intended for the listener 
(communicatively-intended), then they should be less prone to reduction in the retellings, 
especially in the retelling to a new listener (condition B).   
4.3.  Recording  
All recordings were performed without the presence of the researcher. Speakers 
were video-recorded during the experiment, where the original MTS files were converted 
to MP4 files before transcription and coding. Additionally, speakers were also audio-
recorded with a Marantz PMD 671 since this is the same set of data used in chapter II.   
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4.4. Procedures  
Speakers were told that they would be watching a short video clip of a cooking 
show.  Their goal was to become familiar with the content of the clip so that they could 
explain it to other undergraduate students who were scheduled for a related experiment. 
They were told that the amount of time spent watching the stimulus was not being 
recorded and that they could replay the clip as many times as they wished. They watched 
the stimulus at least twice on a computer screen while alone.  Once they felt that they 
have a good grasp of the material, they informed the researcher who was waiting in a 
room nearby.    
Speakers explained how a pizza dough is made three times, twice to listener 1, 
and once to listener 2. Both listeners were confederate listeners who were counter-
balanced across speakers (see use of confederates in section 5.2. in chapter I to tease 
apart the confound between Listener-modeling and Listener interaction).   
Listeners were counter-balanced across speakers.  Between each telling, there was a ten-
minute break where speakers were asked to play a game of Tetris on the computer by 
themselves. These extended breaks are a conservative choice since they are intended to 
minimize reduction due to repetition priming from the previous telling.   
First, the speakers told the story to the listener 1, followed by a ten-minute Tetris 
break.  Then, the speakers repeated the same story to listener 2 (a new listener), followed 
by a ten-minute Tetris break.  Lastly, speakers, again, repeated the same story to listener 
1.  Prior to the last condition (repetition to listener 1 again), speakers were told that the 
recording equipment malfunctioned in the first telling and that the recording needed to be 
conducted again. The rationale for this scenario is so that speakers would not be under the 
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impression that listener 1 did not understand the content of what was told, which could 
lead to hypergesticulation in the repetition (see also Hoetjes et al., 2014 on the impact of 
a negative feedback). 
Speakers were debriefed and were also asked what they thought the experiment 
was about; two most common responses were either it was a memory task or it was on 
how people talk to men vs. women since the listeners were of both genders and the study 
was conducted in a sociolinguistics lab. They did not suspect it was a gesture study.   
4.5.  Experimental conditions and hypotheses  
The sequence of listeners used in this study originally appeared in Galati & 
Brennan (2010, 2013). This sequence of listeners is preferred since it allows teasing apart 
the confound between reduction due to automatization and reduction due to assumed 
information status (see section 5.1 in chapter I). A replica of table 2 in chapter I is 
presented below for convenience. 
  
Condition Speaker production Listener exposure 
A  
Listener 1 
    First production  
First hearing 
B 
Listener 2 
 
Subsequent production 
C 
Listener 1 
Subsequent 
hearing 
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In condition A, speakers present the information for the first time, and the listener 
hears the information for the first time.  Since information is new to both interlocutors, 
we consider condition A to be the baseline. In other words, speakers should show the 
most motoric commitment and effort in the explanation in this condition, resulting in the 
biggest gesture size used.  
In condition B, speakers repeat the same information for the second time; hence, 
the information is assumed old to the speaker. However, the same information is assumed 
new to listener 2 since it is the first time he/she is hearing it. In this condition, the 
Listener-neutral explanation would predict that because of automatization, speakers will 
show less motoric commitment and effort in gesturing, resulting in smaller gesture size 
when compared to condition A. On the other hand, the Listener-modeling explanation 
would predict gesture size to remain comparable to condition A since speakers are 
sensitive to the fact that listener 2 has not heard the information before.  
In condition C, the speakers repeat the story to listener 1 again.  The information 
is assumed old to both interlocutors.  The Listener-neutral explanation would predict the 
least motoric commitment and effort since the same information is repeated for the third 
time. In addition, the Listener-modeling explanation would also predict less motoric 
commitment and effort since listener 1 has already heard the information before in 
condition A.  
4.6.  Coding 
  As preparation for representational gesture coding, speech sound was transcribed 
and segmented into intonation phrases independent of the video.  In this study, a pause 
that exceeds 100 milliseconds designates a new intonation phrase (cf. Kendall, 2013). 
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Navigated only by the transcription and the assistance of audio files, 230 triplets were 
located.  In other words, events that were verbally described across all three conditions 
were located. Table 8 shows events in a chronological sequence of pizza making that are 
found in participants’ verbal description of the stimuli.  
 
Table 8: Events of a of pizza making verbally described by speakers  
 
Event Example of linguistic description 
1 ‘You take the dough’ 
2 ‘You flour the surface/table’ 
3 ‘You put the dough rough side down [on the table]’ 
4 ‘You stretch the dough’ 
5 ‘Until the dough gets this big’ 
6 ‘Then you stretch the dough with your knuckle’ 
7 ‘If there’s a tear in the dough, you can fix it’ 
8 ‘You can fix the dough by folding over’ 
9 ‘Press down on the dough with your fingertips’ 
10 ‘You stretch it again’ 
11 ‘Until it’s about this size’ 
12 ‘Then you take the, uh, the [pizza peel]’ 
13 ‘You flour the pizza peel so the dough won’t stick’ 
14 ‘Put the dough in the oven’ 
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If a speaker explains that the surface of the table should be floured (event 2), then 
the verbal explanation of this event must occur in condition A, B, and C to be included in 
the analysis. The exclusion of data points such as this was because the motivation for 
omission cannot be determined; it could have been because the speaker simply forgot to 
mention the event or it could have been because the speaker omitted the event due to an 
assumption about the knowledge of the listener.  
Note that speakers’ descriptions of an event need not be identical linguistically 
across three conditions.  The use of lexical items and/or syntactic structure may vary, and 
indeed they often did, but as long as the utterances describe the same event, they were 
selected for analysis.  All data points of interest from the original files were turned into 
short video files that only represented the events, where the conditions were omitted for 
trial-blindness. All triplets were parsed into gesture units and gesture phrases (McNeill, 
1992) in ELAN (Sloetjes & Wittenburg, 2008).    
Only mimetic representational gestures were selected for analysis in this chapter 
to keep the data homogenous by function.  Since absolute size representational gestures, 
in (5) and (11), are considered to serve a different function (see chapter III), they were 
excluded from the analysis. In addition, representational gestures that occur with speech 
dysfluencies while retrieving a lexeme in (12) were also excluded. These gestures have 
been argued to be inherently non-communicative; they have been argued to function to 
assist speakers with recalling the word (Krauss et al., 1995; Krauss et al., 1991). 
However, whether they successfully assist speakers with lexical retrieval is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.  In sum, the selection of data points is function-based.   
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In order to examine reduction in mimetic representational gestures, a way to code 
reduction magnitude was needed. Mimetic representational gestures were coded 
categorically on the basis of the set of body parts actively involved in the production of 
the gesture.  The categorical coding decision includes: shoulder (the most motoric effort), 
elbow, wrist, fingers, or no movement (the least motoric effort). This category of coding 
is somewhat similar to that in Hoetjes et al. (2015) in the sense that the method here, too, 
examines body parts executed in gesturing; furthermore, no movement was included as a 
category.  Note that self-adapters (e.g., scratching the face or playing with the hair) are 
also included in the no movement category as they are presumed to carry no semantic 
content and to not be generated by the speech production system.   
All body parts are paired in all possible combinations of body movements with 
independent coding for each arm. Therefore, possible combinations range from: 
[shoulder/shoulder] as the most motoric effort and [no movement/no movement] as the 
least motoric effort. The order is arranged iconically from [left/right].  All other possible 
combinations fall in between the most motoric effort and least motoric effort.  For 
instance, a combination of [elbow/shoulder], treated identically to [shoulder/elbow], are 
both ranked to indicate less motoric effort than [shoulder/shoulder]. When multiple body 
parts are in motion, the bigger body part, which entails more motoric effort, is always 
coded to be conservative in the coding decision; for example, if both the wrists and 
fingers are in motion, the data point is coded as wrists, not fingers.  
Body parts in motion are presumed to be a measure of motoric commitment and 
effort in gesturing: it indicates how much motoric commitment and effort speakers are 
willing to invest gesturally in the description of the same event.   Operating under the 
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assumption that gestures that are bigger in size require more motoric effort than gestures 
that are smaller in size, gesture size can be interpreted as revealing motoric commitment.  
The dependent variables are either: (1) a decrease in body parts combination in motion 
from the previous condition or (2) a no decrease in body parts combination in motion 
from the previous condition.   
4.7. Predictors for mimetic representational gesture size and analysis 
Data were analyzed using linear mixed effects models in the binomial family in R 
(R Development Core Team, 2014) with the lme4 package (Bates, 2013), with condition 
as a fixed effect, a random intercept for subject and a random slope for condition within 
subject.  P values reported below were based on the z approximation.  To address the 
concern that p values-based on the z statistics for mixed effects model may be anti-
conservative, the p values were also checked by comparing models with and without the 
predictor of interest, using a log likelihood test.  The results show no qualitative 
difference to the z-based estimates reported below.  
5.  Results and preliminary discussion   
The binomial test showed a steady decline in body parts in motion as a function of 
repetition across condition A, B, and C.  In the mosaic plots, the light gray area shows 
that a decrease has occurred from the previous condition; whereas, the dark gray area 
shows that a decrease has not occurred, meaning motoric commitment remained the same 
from the previous condition or increased from the previous condition. Bars in the mosaic 
plots are arranged according to size of body parts combination, from largest (to the left of 
the plot) to smallest (to the right of the plot), with the exclusion of no movement in both 
hands, for such category has reached floor in physical movement and is impossible to 
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reduce any further.  Note that in the mosaic plots, s refers to shoulder, e refers to elbow, 
w refers to wrist, f refers to fingers, and 0 refers to no movement.  Each combination pair 
is arranged from left to right; for example, w0 refers to left wrist and no movement on the 
right. 
 
Figure 17: Change in body parts in motion from condition A to condition B 
 
 
 
Figure 17 shows a decline in body parts in motion from condition A to condition 
B. The width of each bar indicates the proportion of the combination of body parts in the 
data.  Gestures in condition B involve less motoric commitment than in gestures in 
condition A 82 percent of the time. Overall, the light grey area is significantly greater 
than 50 percent of the total area: b = 2.30, se(b) = 0.25, z = 9.40, p < .05. 
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Figure 18: Change in body parts in motion from condition B to condition C 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 shows a decline in body parts in motion from condition B to condition 
C. The width of each bar indicates the proportion of the combination of body parts in the 
data. Gestures in condition C involve less motoric commitment than in gestures in 
condition B 71 percent of the time.  Again, the light grey area is significantly greater than 
50 percent of the total area: b = 2.58, se(b) = 0.37, z = 6.99, p < .05.  
In both mosaic plots, notice that a decrease prominently occurs with bigger body 
part combinations (to the left of the mosaic plots), and no decrease prominently occurs 
with smaller body parts (to the right of the mosaic plots).  This trend is to be expected as 
bigger body parts have more opportunity for a decrease; in contrast, smaller body parts 
have less opportunity for a decrease, for they are approaching floor in physical 
movement.   
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To better demonstrate the result, figure 19 exemplifies a case of a continued 
decrease in motoric commitment as a function of repetition.  In this example, the speaker 
is explaining event 10 (see table 8) of the pizza-making process where the stretching of 
the dough takes place. The more times this speaker repeats the same information 
regardless of the assumed knowledge of the listener, the less motoric commitment is 
utilized, as shown by smaller body parts in motion.  
 
Figure 19: An example of a decrease in motoric commitment as a function of repetition 
 
 
 
 
In condition A, the speaker used two elbows to demonstrate the action of 
stretching the dough, then in condition B, both elbows are still and only two wrists are 
used when re-telling stretching of the dough to a new listener.  Lastly, in condition C, 
when the speaker was retelling to the first listener (the same person as in condition A), 
his gesturing has decreased to wiggling fingers on both hands.  
In sum, speakers are largely insensitive to the listener’s assumed state of 
knowledge. They continually invest in less and less motoric commitment and gestural 
effort regardless of the assumed state of knowledge of the listener. The results can be 
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interpreted that mimetic representational gestures are performed for the speaker, rather 
for the listener since they speakers do not appear to be modeling the listener’s assumed 
state of knowledge.  
6.  A perceptual judgment follow-up study 
In Galati & Brennan (2013), two coders, the first author and another researcher, 
rate the space in between two hands to determine a repeated gesture’s size.  In Hoetjes et 
al. (2014), however, the authors use body parts to determine a repeated gesture’s size.  
Although the coding criteria used in this chapter are somewhat similar to Hoetjes et al. 
(2014) in the sense that body parts used in gesturing are observed, the current method of 
coding differs from theirs in several aspects (see section 4.6 in this chapter).  Since the 
coding method is somewhat novel, a perceptual judgment follow-up by naïve raters 
allows justification of the coding decisions; importantly, it can demonstrate whether the 
coding parameters correspond to behavior observable and interpretable by the observer in 
real time.   
6.1.  Participants and the stimuli  
A total of nine raters, seven males and two females, participated in rating of 
participant gestural behavior.  Triplets of the data were chosen randomly and presented in 
E-Prime (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2012). Importantly, only the speakers were 
visible to the raters; that is, the confederates were taken out of the frame.  The stimuli 
were presented without audio.  
6.2.  Procedures  
Raters judged 112 triplets, which are half of all triplets in the data. Without 
knowledge of the condition, raters were presented with pairs of videos and asked to judge 
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which of the two exhibits more gestural effort. Unbeknownst to the raters, the paired clips 
corresponded to gestures about the same event from two different adjacent tellings (A & 
B, B & A, B & C or C & B). Tellings were counterbalanced across pairs, so the video 
from the earlier telling appeared on the left side of the screen half the time. Order of 
video pairs was randomized.  Raters were able to see the speakers only; confederate 
listeners were excluded from the frame.  Raters were able to view each comparison once; 
reaction time was not recorded.   
Participants were instructed to judge gestural effort on the basis of a set of cues 
for detecting more gestural effort.  They are: body parts used in the action (bigger body 
parts suggest a more effortful action than smaller body parts), the width of the action (a 
wider gesture suggests a more effortful action than a narrower gesture), the height of the 
action (a higher gesture suggests a more effortful action than a lower gesture), and the 
force of the action (a more forceful gesture suggests a more effortful action than a less 
forceful gesture). Furthermore, all self-adapters (e.g., playing with hair or scratching the 
face) were asked to be judged as less effortful as they presumably contain no semantic 
content.  
6.3. Predictors for gestural effort and analysis 
The binary relative size judgment data were analyzed using linear mixed effects 
models in the binomial family in R (R Development Core Team, 2014) with the lme4 
package (Bates, 2013), with raters and video triplets as random intercepts. Since the main 
interest is in whether the relative judgments are significantly different from choosing the 
two conditions with chance probabilities (50/50), there is no fixed effects predictor in the 
models reported. 
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6.4.  Results and preliminary discussion  
 Raters judged gestures in condition A to exhibit more gestural effort than gestures 
in condition B 68 percent of the time: b = 1.06, se(b) = 0.19, z = 5.42, p < .05. In the 
same direction, they judged gestures from condition B to exhibit more effort than 
gestures from condition C 69 percent of the time: b = 1.05, se(b) = 0.24, z = 4.45, p < .05.   
 The results indicate that naïve raters can perceptually detect a reduced gestural 
effort as a function of repetition.  That is, raters observed a constant decline in repeated 
gestures across triplets, from condition A to condition B and from condition B to 
condition C. This perceptual judgment provides additional support for the novel coding 
scheme used in this study. The coding provides details about the motoric behavior of the 
speaker, and these details align with the subjective impression of naïve viewers.  
7.  Preliminary general discussion 
The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that mimetic representational gestures 
decrease in size as a simple function of repetition, and not in response to the assumed 
state of knowledge of the listener. In addition, gesture reduction is perceptually detectable 
to naïve raters.  Three plausible explanations that do not contradict are offered.   
An appealing explanation for the pattern shown in the result is that automatization 
causes reduction; that is, reduction is caused by an automatized process in motor planning 
that is rooted in the speaker’s internal production system (Bybee, 2001, 2002). The more 
times a motoric action is performed, the more it will reduce.  Without a need for 
hypergesticulation (e.g., for clarification or emphasis), reduction could continue until it 
reaches floor.  In the case of gesturing, floor could be a complete lack of gesturing. 
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Articulators in gesturing are larger in size than in speech and may reduce all the way to 
no movement; the scale of reduction is more observable and prominent.   
Another explanation, which does not contradict the previous explanation, is that 
speakers require less assistance from gestures in the retellings due to a decrease in 
cognitive demand.  Kita (2000) proposes that gestures can help speaking, that “speakers 
are cognitively compelled to produce more representational gestures if the spatio-motoric 
event to be verbally conveyed does not readily lend itself to linguistic structuring […] (p. 
181).  Operating under Kita’s model, it is plausible that when the cognitive demand is 
high (in the first and novel telling), speakers utilize more gesturing to assist with speech 
production. However, in the retellings when the cognitive demand is lower due to greater 
accessibility (see Ariel, 1988, 1980) or rehearsal (see Chawla & Krauss, 1994), the value 
of gesturing diminishes, resulting in reduction. The relationship between cognitive 
demand and reduction in representational gesture has been made apparent by Masson-
Carro et al. (2014), who report that when there is a higher cognitive demand, there 
appears to be less reduction in a repeated gesture. In this case, repeating the same 
information leads to less cognitive demand; thus, speakers’ gestures reduce.  
Unlike Kita’s (2000) proposal, which focuses on how representational gestures 
assist speaker in packaging information and how representational gestures intertwine with 
speech, Hostetter & Alibali’s (2008) Gesture as Simulated Action (GSA) framework 
focuses more on more general cognitive processes and how representational gestures are 
a product of such processes.  In their framework, multiple factors influence the 
production of a representational gesture: one of which is the strength of activation of the 
simulated action.  They explained that, “simulated action may be evoked when the task at 
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hand involved imagining […] when motion is a part of the original perception being 
stimulated” (p. 503).  
Operating under this idea, after having been exposed to the stimuli which is 
heavily action-oriented (e.g., stretching, kneading, and folding), speakers may be 
imagining that they, themselves, are working on the dough, which results in mimetic 
representational gestures found in the data.  In the first telling, the simulated action is the 
most evoked; then in the later tellings, at least 10 minutes in the second telling, and at 
least 20 minutes in the last telling (see section 4.4 in this chapter for experimental 
procedures), the simulation becomes much less evoked; hence, less motoric commitment 
is used in enactment of the action.  In most cases, mimetic representational gesture do not 
disappear in the retellings, which could be inferred based on this framework that the 
mental simulation is still activated; it is a matter of the degree of activation.   
The three explanations offered here do not contradict theoretically.  Whether it is 
reduction due to automatization, reduction due to a lower cognitive load, or reduction due 
to a lesser degree of mental simulation, these explanations point to the fact that mimetic 
representational gestures are Listener-neutral; they are rooted in the speaker’s production 
system, intended for the speaker without any inherent reference to the listener.  If these 
mimetic representational gestures were intended to be communicative and produced for 
the listener, then there should not have been a reduction in motoric commitment and 
effort in condition B since the information is presumed new to the listener.  
9.  Preliminary conclusions 
 In this chapter, I have shown that mimetic representational gestures reduce as a 
function of repetition, not as a function of the speakers’ assumed knowledge of the 
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listener. Results in this chapter are consistent with the Listener-neutral explanation; 
speakers utilize mimetic representational gestures to benefit their own cognitive 
processes.  Such gestures reduce when they become less beneficial to the speakers 
themselves.    
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CHAPTER V 
THE REPETITION EFFECT ON REPRESENTATIONAL GESTURES ASSOCIATED 
WITH LEXICAL ACCESS 
1.  Introduction 
 Two kinds of representational gesture were discussed in chapter III and chapter 
IV.  I have shown that despite sharing the characteristic of being unconventionalized, 
absolute size representational gestures are resistant to reduction in repetition, but mimetic 
representational gestures are prone to reduction in repetition.  Based on these results, I 
argued that the different patterns are motivated by the function each kind of 
representational gesture serves. Absolute size representational gestures function to 
convey size information; therefore, they must remain the same in repetition if the speaker 
wishes to accurately covey size information.  Mimetic representational gestures, on the 
other hand, function to assist speakers cognitively; they reduce in repetition since they 
presumably provide less benefit to the speaker.   
 The third kind of gesture, which will be referred to as representational gestures 
associated with lexical access, co-occurs with dysfluent speech. The primary function, as 
Krauss et al. (1996) and Krauss et al. (2000) argued, is to assist speakers cognitively in 
the process of retrieving a lexeme.  Since the function is solely intended for the speaker, 
for a very restricted purpose of lexical retrieval, they are inherently non-communicative. 
Until now, there has yet to be a study that examines under repetition; it has not been 
documented whether these gestures will undergo reduction when they are repeated 
(similar to mimetic representational gesture, see chapter IV); or they will be resistant to 
  104
reduction when they are repeated (similar to absolute size representational gesture, see 
chapter III).  
2.   Selected literature on lexical retrieval and gestures  
 The Listener-neutral explanation (see section 3.2. in chapter I) contends that 
representational gestures are meant for the speaker and function to serve the speaker 
cognitively, arguably to assist in speech production.  Although Graham & Heywood 
(1995) found that prohibiting speakers from gesturing does not affect speech production, 
others have presented evidence to suggest otherwise.  Rauscher, Krauss, & Chen (1996), 
for instance, showed that when speakers are prohibited from gesturing, their speech 
becomes less fluent; along the same line, Hostetter, Alibali, & Kita (2007) showed that 
linguistic description of an event is more semantically-rich when gestures are not 
restricted. These studies suggest that restricting speakers from gesturing leads to a poorer 
performance in speech; conversely, allowing speakers to gesture leads to a better 
performance in speech.   
Gestures have been shown to lend a hand when speakers encounter difficulties in 
retrieving a lexeme.  Morsella & Krauss (2004) showed that the rate of gesturing is a 
function of lexical access difficulty; that is, the more difficult the word, the higher rate of 
gesturing is found, and vice versa. The benefits of gesturing are noteworthy when 
speakers encounter the tip-of-the-tongue state (ToT), a state in which speakers fail to 
retrieve a word.  For instance, prohibiting speakers from gesturing results in a poor 
outcome in resolving the ToT state (Frick-Hornsbury & Guttentag, 1998, although see 
also Beattie & Caughlan, 1999 for a contradicting result). Not only adults have shown to 
benefit from gesturing when they are in the ToT state; children, too, have been found to 
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better resolve the tip-of-the-tongue state when representational gestures are not prohibited 
(Pine, Bird, & Kirk, 2007).  
The Lexical Retrieval Hypothesis, as proposed by Krauss et al. (2000), maintains 
that one of the functions of representational gestures is to assist speakers in retrieving a 
lexeme.  The model spells out the cognitive architecture of how these representational 
gestures function to assist the speaker. Their model based on Levelt’s (1992) model of 
speech production, which is a cascading model that begins with the conceptualizer and 
ends with the articulator. Representational gestures facilitate speech production at the 
lemma level, the stage where grammatical encoding occurs, through a kinesic monitor, a 
cross-model priming, to aid speakers in lexical retrieval. Once the word is retrieved and 
the speaker utters the word, representational gestures are terminated since the goal of 
lexical retrieval has been achieved (Krauss et al., 2000, see Figure 13.1, p. 267). It must 
be emphasized that according to Kraus et al. (2000) these gestures are not intended for 
the listener, for their sole function is a assist the speaker (see 3.2 in chapter I for a more 
detailed discussion).   
3.  Objectives of this chapter 
  In this chapter, I will demonstrate that representational gestures associated with 
lexical access, like mimetic representational gestures (see chapter IV), undergo reduction 
in repetition. Regardless of whether retrieval difficulties have been resolved, speakers’ 
motoric commitment and effort reduces in repetition.  Hence, I argue that reduction in 
representational gesture in repetition is an automatized process that operates across 
multiple functions.    
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4.  Methods 
4.1.  Participants & stimuli  
Eight naïve raters, five males and three females, were recruited for this rating 
task.  They were students in an introductory psycholinguistic class, participating for extra 
credit. Navigated solely by the transcription, segments where participants verbally refer 
to the pizza peel (see Table 8, sequence 12 in chapter IV).  Figure 20 is an example of the 
object.  When participants refer to this object across three tellings, they were selected and 
converted into individual video files. The triplets were chosen randomly and presented to 
naïve raters in E-Prime without audio (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2012). Note 
that participants appearing in the triplets need not refer to the object as the pizza peel.  
Any linguistic description that points to the object suffices.  
 
Figure 20: The pizza peel in the stimuli 
 
 
 
4.2.  Procedures  
Raters judged 21 triplets of the pizza peel data.  Without knowledge of the 
condition, raters were presented with pairs of videos and asked to judge which of the two 
exhibits more gestural effort. Unbeknownst to the raters, the paired clips corresponded to 
gestures about the same event from two different adjacent tellings (A & B, B & A, B & 
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C, C & B, A & C, or C & A). Tellings were counterbalanced across pairs, so the video 
from the earlier telling appeared on the left side of the screen half the time. Order of 
video pairs was randomized.  Raters were able to see the speakers only; confederate 
listeners were excluded from the frame.  Raters were able to view each comparison once; 
reaction time was not recorded.   
Participants were instructed to judge gestural effort on the basis of a set of cues 
for detecting more gestural effort.  They are: body parts used in the action (bigger body 
parts suggest a more effortful action than smaller body parts), the width of the action (a 
wider gesture suggests a more effortful action than a narrower gesture), the height of the 
action (a higher gesture suggests a more effortful action than a lower gesture), and the 
force of the action (a more forceful gesture suggests a more effortful action than a less 
forceful gesture). Furthermore, all self-adapters (e.g., playing with hair or scratching the 
face) were asked to be judged as less effortful as they presumably contain no semantic 
content.  
4.3. Predictors for gestural effort and analysis 
The binary relative size judgment data were analyzed using linear mixed effects 
models in the binomial family in R (R Development Core Team, 2014) with the lme4 
package (Bates, 2013), with raters and video triplets as random intercepts. Since the main 
interest is in whether the relative judgments are significantly different from choosing the 
two conditions with chance probabilities (50/50), there is no fixed effects predictor in the 
models reported. 
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4.4.  Results and preliminary discussion  
 Raters judged gestures in condition A to exhibit more gestural effort than gestures 
in condition B 74 percent of the time: b = 1.61, se(b) = 0.50, z = 3.22, p < .05. In the 
same direction, they judged gestures from condition A to exhibit more effort than 
gestures from condition C 76 percent of the time: b = 1.67, se(b) = 0.51, z = 3.28, p < .05.  
However, gestures in condition B were not found to exhibit more gestural effort than 
gestures in condition C: b = 0.52, se(b) = 0.43, z = 1.20, p > .05. 
4.4.1.  Examples of lexical retrieval difficulties and gesturing  
 To better illustrate what raters observed in the stimuli, this section provides 
examples that show a decrease in motoric commitment and effort in the repetition, 
regardless of whether the lexical retrieval difficulties have been resolved in the retelling. 
Terms used to describe speakers’ gestures are from Streeck (2008) depiction methods, 
where bounding is defined as “practices involving relative positioning […] of the hands 
[…] Sometimes the hands are configured as if they were in contact with the object’s 
boundaries (sides or edges) […] (p. 292). In addition, handling is defined as “objects are 
indirectly represented by a schematic act that “goes with them”, in a way in which 
turning goes with keys and wielding with sticks […] (Streeck, 2008, p. 293).   
 The following three figures, from Figure 21 to Figure 23, demonstrate a case 
when speakers encounter lexical retrieval difficulties in the first telling, as indicated by 
disfluencies in speech; then, in the later tellings, the difficulties were resolved, as 
indicated by fluent speech. 
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Figure 21: An example of lexical retrieval difficulties resolved, first telling 
 
 
 
In Figure 21, the first telling, the speaker said flour the <pause> wooden pizza 
<pause> pan.  Lexical retrieval difficulties are indicated by the filled pauses.  The 
handling depiction preceded the verbal counterpart wooden, where the speaker was 
depicting handling an object, as in holding the pizza peel.   The bounding depiction 
coincides with the rest of the utterance, where his hands outline the edge of the pizza 
peel.  Two depictions of representational gestures were present while the speaker was 
encountering lexical access difficulties, verbally struggling to name the object.  These 
representational gestures are presumed to function in assisting the speaker while 
retrieving the lexeme.   
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Figure 22: An example of lexical retrieval difficulties resolved, second telling 
 
 
  
In Figure 22, the second telling, he said you got a wooden pizza pan.  The speaker 
did not exhibit any disfluency in speech; thus, there was not a lexical retrieval difficulty.  
The only representational gesture coinciding with speech is the bounding depiction, a 
representational gesture that was also used in the first telling.   
Notice that when speech is fluent, there is a reduction, from handling and bounding to 
bounding only.   
 
Figure 23: An example of lexical retrieval difficulties resolved, third telling 
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In Figure 23, the third telling, he said put it on the wooden pizza pan.  Again, the 
speaker did not exhibit any disfluency in speech, and the representational gesture used 
was also bounding.  The third telling is similar in motoric commitment and effort to the 
second telling, but it is different from the first telling.   
In contrast to the last speaker, the next speaker encountered lexical retrieval 
difficulties repeatedly.  In other words, every time he referred to the object, there was a 
clear disfluency in his speech, suggesting lexical retrieval difficulties.  Figure 24 to 
Figure 26 demonstrates such case.   
 
Figure 24: An example of repeated lexical retrieval difficulties, first telling 
 
 
 In Figure 24, the first telling, the speaker said he had <pause>, pallet, uh, thing 
that thing where you put pizza in the oven.  Lexical retrieval difficulties were indicated by 
disfluencies in speech, consisting a filled pause preceding pallet and the filler uh.  The 
bounding depiction (leftmost photo) coincides with the verbal counterpart pallet.  The 
bounding depiction in this case is the speaker outlining the bottom of the pizza peel.  The 
handling depiction (middle and rightmost photo) occurred repeatedly, in three strokes, 
until the end of the utterance.  
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Figure 25: An example of repeated lexical retrieval difficulties, second telling 
 
 
In Figure 25, the second telling, the speaker said on the <pause> wooden, um, 
<pause> thing that you take out of the oven.  In this retelling, speech disfluencies still 
appeared in the form of filled pauses before wooden and thing; the filler, um, was also 
used.  The depiction that occurred alongside disfluent speech, however, has been reduced 
to handling only, despite the recurring retrieval difficulty.   
 
Figure 26: An example of repeated lexical retrieval difficulties, third telling 
 
 
 
In Figure 26, the third telling, the speaker said on the wooden <pause> scoop 
<pause> thing. Speech disfluencies still appeared in the form of filled pauses before 
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scoop and thing.  The depiction that occurred alongside disfluent speech was handling, 
similar to the second telling but reduced from the first telling.   
5.  Preliminary discussion 
The purpose of this chapter is not to evaluate the Lexical Retrieval Hypothesis 
(Krauss, 2000) nor is it to test whether representational gestures effectively facilitate 
lexical retrieval.  Rather, it aims to observe representational gestures that have been 
argued to function in assisting speakers with lexical retrieval difficulties in the Repetition 
Effect. One might expect that like absolute size representational gestures (see chapter III), 
lexical access representational gestures would be resistant to reduction by virtue of their 
presumed function.  However, it appears that regardless of their presumed function in 
helping speakers retrieve a lexeme, speakers show a decrease in motoric commitment and 
effort from the first telling to the second telling.  
Figure 21 to Figure 23 show a pattern that is to be expected.  When speakers are 
encountered with lexical retrieval difficulties (in this data is the first telling), they utilize 
representational gestures that are intended to aid lexical retrieval, as Krauss (2000) 
proposed. That there are more representational gestures when speakers have difficulties 
accessing a word is anticipated, considering the presumed function of the gesture. The 
finding in this chapter is similar to that of Morsella & Krauss (2004), where speakers 
gestured at a higher rate when the word they tried to access was more difficult.  In sum, 
when speakers have trouble accessing a lexeme, representational gestures become 
prominent, which could be measured by means of motoric commitment and effort, as 
presented in this chapter, or in rate, as reported by Morsella & Krauss (2004).   
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Figure 24 to Figure 26, however, show an unexpected pattern.  Operating under 
the assumption that representational gestures facilitate speakers when they encounter 
lexical retrieval difficulties, there should not be a reduction in repetition, considering 
speakers still require assistance from such gestures to retrieve the lexeme. In other words, 
there should not have been a decrease in representational gestures in the second telling, 
compared to the first, because lexical retrieval difficulties still persist.   
Automatization is one explanation for the Repetition Effect found in lexical 
retrieval representational gestures.  Bybee (2001, 2002) proposed that any repeated 
motoric action reduces when it is repeated. To Bybee, the automatized motoric action is 
articulation in speech (see chapter I, section 3.1.1.); in this case, the motoric action that is 
automatized is gesture.  Importantly, reduction in gesture caused by automatization seems 
to occur across multiple gesture functions. That is, whether representational gestures are 
used to assist in conceptualization (see chapter IV) or whether they are used to assist in 
lexical retrieval (the current chapter), if their function is presumed to be for the speaker to 
benefit the speaker, then they are likely to undergo reduction in repetition.  
6.  Preliminary conclusions 
In this chapter, I have exemplified and discussed the Repetition Effects in 
representational gestures associated with lexical access. Similar to mimetic gestures, 
gestures also reduce in motoric commitment and effort when they are repeated, even 
when speakers still face retrieval difficulties.  The Repetition Effect, thus, appears to be a 
much more general phenomenon that occurs across representational gesture functions, 
especially when the function is presumed to serve the speaker cognitively.   
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CHAPTER VI 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
1.  Introduction 
 Although the Repetition Effect is observed in both speech and representational 
gesture, its behavior is specific to modality. In speech, the Repetition Effect only occurs 
within a coherent stretch of discourse, where first mention of a word is always longer 
than the subsequent mentions regardless of the speakers’ assumption of the state of 
knowledge of the listener.  That the first-mention of a word within a coherent stretch of 
discourse is always longer than its subsequent counterparts is accounted for by the 
Exemplar model and conventionalization of discourse structure (see chapter II).   
The Repetition Effect in representational gestures, on the other hand, varies 
largely depending on the function the representational gesture is intended to serve.  If a 
representational gesture is prone to benefit the speaker cognitively, then it will undergo 
reduction in repetition. Specifically, mimetic representational gestures and 
representational gestures associated with lexical access, two kinds of representational 
gesture that have been argued to benefit then speakers cognitively, undergo reduction in 
repetition (see chapter IV and chapter V). In contrast, if a representational gesture has a 
communicative function, then it may be resistant to the Repetition Effect, as shown with 
absolute size representational gesture (see chapter III).  
Despite having demonstrated how and the extent to which the Repetition Effect 
manifests itself in two different modalities, the crux of the dissertation is not necessarily 
about the Repetition Effect. The Repetition Effect is essentially an indicator about the 
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nature of speakers’ production; it is an indicator, which allows inference about speakers’ 
cognitive mechanism and how speakers communicate information.   
2.  Methodological improvements 
 The experiments in this dissertation are a product of utilizing an existing design 
while improving it for a tighter control, which results in a more precise interpretation of 
results, both in this study and previous studies.  The experiments consist of using a 
sequence of listeners to tease apart a confound between new and old/given information 
between the speaker and the listener; the sequence of listeners originally appeared in 
Galati & Brennan (2010, 2013) (see section 5.1 in chapter I).  In addition to the sequence 
of listeners, these listeners were confederates who provided minimal linguistic and non-
linguistic feedback to the speaker in order to tease apart a confound between listener-
interaction from listener-modeling (see section 5.2 in chapter I).  By combining these 
elements, two confounds were eliminated, yielding results that differ from past literature.  
This section elaborates the importance of the current experimental design and the 
contribution it has made to the literature.   
2.1. Multiple listeners required: the notion of information status disentangled  
 Several studies in speech and gesture position their results on the Repetition 
Effect as motivated by information status (see, for example, section 3.1.3 on prosodic 
prominence and section 4.1.2. on representational gesture in chapter I). Indeed, 
information status plays a crucial role in language production; however, it is premature to 
conclude that information status is responsible for the Repetition Effect when only a 
single listener is present. Table 1 and section 5.1 in chapter I highlights the confound 
when a single listener is used to elicit the Repetition Effect. To restate, by having only 
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one listener, it cannot be determined whether the reduction in repeated referents is driven 
by automatization, something that occurs automatically due to human physiology, which 
is consistent with the Listener-neutral explanation (see section 3.1.1. in chapter I on 
speech and section 3.2.2 in chapter I on representational gesture) or the reduction in 
repeated referents is driven by speakers’ modeling of the assumed state of knowledge of 
the listener, which is consistent with the Listener-modeling explanation (see Fowler & 
Housum, 1997 and 1988, for example).   
Section 5.1. in chapter II spells out how Galati & Brennan’s (2010, 2013) 
experimental design disentangles the confound between automatization and listener-
modeling. Precisely, their design creates a mismatch between assumed state of 
information for the speaker and for the listener, allowing a precision in pin pointing to 
whom the state of information applies to and the underlying motivation that is responsible 
for guiding speaker behavior.  Indisputably, their experimental design creates a condition 
that essentially teases apart the said confound. Any study that intends to investigate the 
role of assumed state of information in discourse should utilize this particular design to 
avoid conflating the Repetition Effect deriving from automatization and the Repetition 
Effect deriving from listener-modeling.   
2.2. Minimal feedback: the notion of listener-sensitivity re-examined  
 Past literature argues that speakers show listener-sensitivity by means of modeling 
the state of knowledge of the listener. Such argument has been supported by evidence 
elicited from the Repetition Effect (see chapter I for a full review, section 4.1 for speech 
and section 4.2 for gesture). Without a doubt, I agree that speakers may model the state of 
knowledge of the listener and that their production could be a reflection of such 
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sensitivity.  The concern here, however, is whether the data that were used in past 
literature are compatible with and appropriate for the argument.  In this dissertation, I 
propose that the notion of listener-sensitivity should be construed in two mutually 
exclusive ways: listener-sensitivity deriving from an on-going and dynamic interaction 
between interlocutors (the Listener-interactive explanation, see section 2.4. in chapter I) 
and listener-sensitivity deriving from the speakers modeling the state of knowledge of the 
listener (the Listener-modeling explanation, see section 2.3. in chapter I).  
The former interpretation, the Listener-interactive explanation, is rooted in 
interaction between two people, where both linguistic and non-linguistic cues act in 
concert, constantly changing (see Clark & Schaefer, 1989 on contribution in discourse 
and Goodwin, 1981 on interaction between speakers and hearers). For example, if a 
speaker says something that the listener fails to understand, it is likely that the listener 
will cue the speaker that a clarification is needed. The listener could demand for a 
clarification verbally (e.g., asking what do you mean?), or the listener could show non-
verbal cues (e.g., tilting the head or making a puzzled face). Attentive speakers are 
sensitive to such cues and will adjust their performance, in speech and gesture, to meet 
the listener’s needs (see Horton & Keysar’s 1996 on the Monitoring and Adjustment 
model).  The fluid exchange of verbal and/or non-verbal information, which drives the 
interaction, is key to this interpretation of listener-sensitivity.   
On the other hand, the latter interpretation of listener-sensitivity, the Listener-
modeling explanation, is rooted purely in the speaker’s assumption of the listener’s state 
of knowledge (see also Horton & Keysar’s 1996 on the Initial Design model). A simple 
example would be one of the functions of the definite article the in English (Du Bois, 
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1980). For instance, a speaker may say to her friend I will bring curry to the party; in this 
case, by using the definite article the, she assumes that the listener shares the knowledge 
that there will be a party, and this presumption is reflected via the grammar of English.  
Indeed, if her assumption of the listener’s state of knowledge is false, the listener is likely 
to respond with an utterance such as What party? or perhaps, the listener may make a 
puzzled expression as a response.  Note that with anticipatory modeling, the decision to 
use the English definite article the can be made in the absence of feedback.   
 The act of responding to listener’s linguistic and non-linguistic behavior (listener-
interactive) and the act of modeling the state of knowledge of the listener (listener-
modeling) are vastly different and should not be conflated, yet they were in past literature 
(see section 4.1.3 and section 5.2 in chapter I). In order to tease apart listener-interactive 
and listener-modeling, production data in this dissertation were elicited with confederate 
listeners in a more controlled environment, which in contrast to experimental conditions 
in past literature.   
In theory, to rigorously test the notion of listener-modeling, there should be a 
complete absence of feedback from the listener, both linguistic and non-linguistic.  
However, in order to create such situation, ecological validity of a face-to-face 
environment would have to be sacrificed (i.e., it is rarely the case that the listener will 
show absolutely no feedback while engaging with the speaker).  As a result, to maintain 
as much ecological validity as possible while aiming to test the notion of listener-
modeling, the experiments in this dissertation were conducted with confederate listeners 
who provided minimal and unvarying feedback.  Confederates were instructed to nod, 
maintain eye contact, and say “uh-huh” in all conditions; doing so allows minimization of 
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possible varying feedback that are likely to lead speakers to respond to “what the listener 
does”, instead of speaker production driven by their assumption of “what the listener 
knows”. Ultimately, the environment created in the experiments in this dissertation 
should be considered a reflection of speakers’ behavior when an interaction goes 
smoothly, without varying input from the listener.  When both linguistic and non-
linguistic feedback is held constant, it results in behavior that is in contrast to past 
literature, which allowed varying feedback.  
Results indicate that when speakers mostly rely on their assumption of the state of 
knowledge of the listener, their performance lacks sensitivity to the listener via modeling 
the state of knowledge of the listener. A pattern in speech production, word duration to be 
precise, emerges: hyperarticulation occurs in the first mention and hypoarticulation 
occurs in the subsequent mentions within the same stretch of coherent discourse.  
Likewise, a pattern in representational gesture production also emerges; motoric 
commitment and effort used in gesturing steadily decreases as a function of repetition.  
These findings are different from findings in past literature that allowed, if not 
encouraged, interlocutors to exchange feedback freely.  
 The findings in this dissertation can be thought of as the baseline of speakers’ 
production. When variables contributed by the listener (i.e., linguistic and non-linguistic 
feedback) are held constant and kept to a minimum, speakers will behave in this default 
manner, which is interpretable as showing a general lack of listener-modeling. However, 
if an interaction is allowed, as past literature have shown, then speakers will respond to 
the interaction and show sensitivity to the listener by adjusting their performance 
accordingly. For instance, speakers may hyperarticulate or hypergesticulate repeated 
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mentions if they receive a verbal and/or non-verbal cue from the listener.  Since 
confederate listeners in the experiments in this dissertation provided no such overt cues, 
there is no motivation for speakers to invest more energy than they are required to in 
production of repeated referents.  
 It should be emphasized that although results in this dissertation differ from 
results presented in past literature, they do not fundamentally contradict. In fact, results 
presented here help strengthen findings in past literature that speakers are, indeed, 
sensitive to the listener. However, I contend that speakers are sensitive to verbal and non-
verbal cues signaled by the listener during an interaction, instead of modeling of the 
listener’s state of knowledge.   
Galati & Brennan (2010, 2013) proposed the “one-bit” model built on listener 
modeling, to account for listener-sensitivity found in their speech and gesture data (see 
section 4.1.3. in chapter I), while using data that were elicited from an interactive 
environment. Based on the findings in this dissertation, I strongly suggest a 
reinterpretation of their results; in other words, listener-sensitivity found in their data 
should be interpreted as having derived from an interaction, rather than the modeling of 
the listener’s state of knowledge, the “one-bit” model.  I predict that if they replicate their 
experiment but eliminate informative listener feedback, they, too, will find an absence in 
listener-sensitivity.   
Similarly, the foundation of Gerwing & Bavelas’s (2004) and Holler & Stevens’ 
(2007) gesture work is based on the notion of common ground, a notion that is often 
interpreted to coincide with the Listener-modeling explanation in the sense that common 
ground is the speakers’ assumption of knowledge between them and the listener prior to 
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the interaction (see section 2.2 in chapter I).  However, an alternative interpretation of 
common ground is that it is something that is built during an interaction, an establishment 
of shared specified knowledge, which is negotiated and built throughout the course of an 
interaction via verbal and non-verbal behavior. This view is similar to that of Gerwing & 
Bavelas (2013) who point out that  “[interlocutors’] accumulation of common ground 
over the course of the dialogue similarly influenced the form of their gestures” (p. 833).  
Therefore, the crucial element is not necessarily what interlocutors assume prior to the 
interaction, the classic sense of common ground, but it is what interlocutors do during the 
interaction that brings about listener-sensitivity.  Thus, I argue that it was not common 
ground per se that drove listener-sensitivity; it was the interaction between two 
interlocutors, working together, that drove listener-sensitivity.  In other words, listener-
sensitivity critically depends on the listener behavior.   
In sum, this dissertation has teased apart the confusion between listener-
sensitivity deriving from an interaction and listener-sensitivity deriving from modeling 
the listener. I have demonstrated that modeling the state of knowledge of the listener 
alone is unlikely to result in listener-sensitivity, at least with respect to reduction 
behavior. Speakers may enter a conversation with a set of beliefs, but such beliefs 
become secondary and can change/updated once an interaction between interlocutors 
takes place. As a result, the interaction between interlocutors should be carefully 
considered when analyzing speech or gesture data since it plays a crucial role in 
influencing speaker production.   
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3.  Cross-modality reduction and automatization  
The Repetition Effect, also called the Reducing Effect (Bybee, 2002a), applies to 
all any kind of neuromotor behavior.  The Repetition Effect has been vigorously 
discussed in the realm of speech production, especially in the area of phonetics (see 
section 3.1.1. in chapter I). The usage-based approach in linguistics has greatly profited 
from observing the Repetition Effect and convincingly accounted for the process of a 
diachronic sound change (see Hooper, 1976; Bybee & Scheibman, 1999; Bybee 2002a; 
Bybee, 2002b; Bybee 2000, for example). As Bybee (2001, 2002) argued, repetition of 
the same motoric sequences causes reduction in speech, where such automatization is 
strictly an internal mechanism on the speaker’s part (the Listener-neutral explanation, see 
section 2.1. in chapter I and section 3.1.1. in chapter I).   
Gesturing, a kind of motoric action, automatically reduces when repeated (see 
chapter IV for mimetic representational gestures and chapter V for lexical access 
representational gestures). This is consistent with Bybee’s proposal that automatization 
applies to any kind of neuromotor behavior.  As a matter of fact, automatization leading 
to reduction in repeated referents can be clearly observed in gesturing. Since gesturing is 
performed in a large spatial range (i.e., the area in which a gesture can occur is minimally 
at the rest position and can be maximally displaced at the speaker’s extended arm length), 
when reduction occurs, it is easily observable. For instance, the reduction from using two 
shoulders to perform a gesture to using two wrists is an observable and prominent 
reduction. Second, gesturing may reduce to as little as no movement, where the zero case 
is a complete absence of gesturing.  In other words, an extreme case of reduction in 
gesturing is synonymous with deletion.  One might argue that speech could behave 
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comparably, for instance final t/d deletion in English (Bybee, 2002a), but this not the 
same case.  While the final t/d segment in speech may be absent or deleted, the root still 
appears; whereas, speakers may reduce a gesture all the way to no movement in 
repetition.   
In short, automatization is a common phenomenon that occurs across modalities.  
Despite having been mostly discussed in the domain of speech production to account for 
sound change, it can also be found in gesticulation, and importantly, more observable and 
prominent in gesturing. Since automatization is not modality specific, it is can be argued 
that any motoric action that is repeated is likely to undergo reduction as Bybee argued.   
4. Conventionalization and the Repetition Effect 
 One element that sets speech and gesture apart is the degree of 
conventionalization. While gesturing is not at all conventionalized by definition (see 
section 2.5 in chapter I), speaking is a highly conventionalized act.  Since the Repetition 
Effect manifests itself differently in the two modalities, one plausible explanation that 
accounts for the patterns is the degree of conventionalization. 
 Based on speech data in chapter II of this dissertation, the Repetition Effect on 
word duration occurs exclusively within a coherent stretch of discourse (within each 
telling).  Regardless of the assumed state of knowledge of the listener, this pattern of the 
Repetition Effect holds true.  I have accounted for this pattern of word duration with the 
Exemplar Model is responsible of an offline mechanism, which essentially becomes a 
conventionalized act (see section 5.1 in chapter II for a full discussion).   
The conventionalization of word duration within a coherent stretch of discourse, 
what I am proposing here, is comparable to the use of the indefinite article a in English in 
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a certain construction.  Generally speaking, the indefinite article a in English is not used 
with old/given information; it is often used with new information (cf. Du Bois, 1980).  
However, one almost always would use the indefinite article a in preference to the 
definite article the after There is in the presentational construction, even if the following 
noun is old/given information, e.g., There is a town that’s called Eugene. In this example, 
regardless of whether the town of Eugene is assumed old/given to the listener, the 
indefinite article a is often the preferred form.   
In this case, the definite article a is simply triggered by the presentational 
construction in English; competent speakers of English need not use it strategically or 
deliberately. It is used automatically since it is highly a conventionalized form that is 
used this particular syntactic construction, the presentational construction. While the 
scope of this example is at the sentence level, the scope of variation in word duration is at 
the discourse level, in each telling.  Therefore, a structure-driven production, i.e., 
conventionalization, exists in multiple layers of language production.   
In addition, conventionalization may put a limitation on how much reduction is 
allowed in repetition. Consider the previous example, there is a town that’s called 
Eugene, which I have argued to be a conventionalized use of the indefinite article a in the 
presentational construction. Despite the number of times the phrase is repeated, the 
speaker may not reduce the indefinite article a to zero as in *there is town called Eugene. 
Reducing the indefinite article a to zero, or an omission of the element, makes the 
sentence ungrammatical.  
Representational gesture, on the other hand, lacks conventionalization by 
definition (see section 2.5. in chapter I for a full definition).  Unlike words, there is no 
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shape or form that conventionally maps onto meaning. Since act itself lacks a concrete 
parameter, it would be difficult to be governed by discourse structure like word duration 
or the use of articles in English.  In other words, an unconventionalized act is unlikely to 
conform to a pattern since the act itself does not have a solid form.   
It would be interesting to observe emblems in repetition, perhaps using the 
paradigm utilized in this dissertation.  Emblems share characteristics with speech, in the 
sense that it has conventionalized meaning/form pair.  For example, holding up the index 
finger and the middle finger is equivalent to the word ‘peace’. At the same time, emblems 
are produced via gesturing, which is a different modality than speech.  Therefore, it 
would be interesting to observe emblems since they share characteristics that of speech 
and gesturing, which could provide more information on the effect of conventionalization 
on repeated referents.    
5.   The functions of representational gesture and the Repetition Effect 
 The purpose of speaking, without a doubt, is to communicate information to the 
listener.   The purpose of representational gesture, on the other hand, is not as clear-cut. It 
seems that, generally speaking, the literature on representational gesture is divided into 
two broad views: gesturing as a speaker-oriented act (see section 3.2.1. in chapter I) or 
gesturing as a listener-oriented act (see section 4.2 in chapter I).  Although 
representational gestures have been found to benefit listeners in comprehension of the 
message (e.g., Alibali et al., 1997; Beattie & Shovelton, 2005; Singer & Goldin-Meadow, 
2005), Hostetter & Alibali (2008) made a convincing point that the information listeners 
gain from representational gesture is secondary to speech.   
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Representational gestures vary in the function they serve. Instead of arguing 
whether representational gestures are for the speaker or for the listener, it is more fruitful 
to view representational gestures as a function-driven act.  Representational gestures that 
primarily benefit speakers cognitively are prone to reduction in repetition, while 
representational gestures that are primarily intended for communication are resistant to 
reduction in repetition.  In other words, representational gestures should not be treated as 
a single-unified class since they vary depending on their function.   
 Chapter III of the dissertation demonstrates that absolute size representational 
gestures do not undergo reduction in repetition. I have argued that this kind of 
representational gesture is resistant to reduction in repetition because of the semantic 
content of size that is embedded in the representational gesture; should any reduction in 
gesturing take place, the semantic content of size will change.  Therefore, I argue that the 
fundamental function of an absolute size representational gesture is for the purpose of 
communicating size information to the listener.   
In contrast, chapter IV and chapter V of the dissertation demonstrate another kind 
of representational gesture.  In chapter IV, mimetic representational gestures show a 
continual decline in motoric commitment and effort as a function of repetition; the more 
they are repeated, the more they are reduced. I argue that this kind of representational 
gesture primarily functions to assist speakers cognitively and is more prone to the 
Repetition Effect due to automatization.   
Similarly, in chapter V, representational gestures associated with lexical access 
undergo reduction in repetition, even when speakers are still faced with lexical access 
difficulties in the repetition. This kind of representational gesture has been vigorously 
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argued in the literature to have no communicative value (e.g., Krauss, 2000) and is solely 
performed to aid the speaker in the process of retrieving a lexeme.  
It should be highlighted that I am neither arguing for nor against the effectiveness 
of this kind of gesture; it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to evaluate the whether 
gestures that occur when speech dysfluencies occur help speakers resolve the problematic 
lexeme.  In this dissertation, I am simply demonstrating that when speakers appear to 
have trouble recalling a word in speech, the motoric effort invested declines as a function 
of repetition. Operating under the assumption that these gestures assist speakers 
cognitively, for the purpose of retrieving a lexeme, they appear to become less and less 
prominent as a function of repetition.   
In this dissertation, I have documented three different kinds of representational 
gesture, two of which can be argued to serve the speakers cognitively and behave 
comparably in the Repetition Effect; the other kind serves to communicate information 
for the speaker is resistant to the Repetition Effect.  Based on the diverged results, I 
recommend treating representational gesture functionally, rather than treating them as a 
single class. Some representational gestures pack a semantic content that is intended for 
the listener, while others may not; as a result, it leads to a variation in communicative 
weight in each category. 
Therefore, to ask whether representational gestures are for the speaker or for the 
listener would be an imprecise question, a question that is too broad to ask.  The 
question, then, becomes what kind of representational gesture is intended for the speaker 
and what kind of representational gesture is intended for the listener? At the very least, 
based on the results presented in this dissertation, absolute size representational gestures 
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are intended for the listener, while mimetic representational gestures and representational 
gestures associate with lexical access are more likely to be intended for the speaker.   
Breaking down representational gestures into sub-classes, navigated by function, 
is the most appropriate and fruitful approach.  I believe that much of the controversy 
regarding whether a representational gesture is for the speaker or for the listener is rooted 
in the fact the specific functions of those representational gestures were not explicitly 
explicated.  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
  Throughout the dissertation, I have demonstrated that the Repetition Effect 
manifests itself differently in each modality.  In speech, the Repetition Effect is confined 
in the scope of a coherent stretch of discourse.  In other words, when a word is repeated 
within a story, its duration will be shorter than in the first mention; this pattern of word 
duration persists regardless of the assumed state of the listener.  On the other hand, two 
kinds of representational gestures, mimetic and representational gestures associated with 
lexical access, appear to undergo the Repetition Effect across a coherent stretch of 
discourse, while one kind of representational gesture, absolute size representational 
gesture, is resistant to the Repetition Effect.   
 While the dissertation captures the Repetition Effect in two modalities, the 
significance of the findings is not necessarily about the Repetition Effect.  In this 
dissertation, I have made the following arguments.  First, listener-modeling alone is 
insufficient to account for speakers’ sensitivity to the listener. To be precise, it is not 
listener-modeling that is responsible for listener-sensitivity as the past literature claims; 
rather, it is the interaction between interlocutors that is responsible for listener-sensitivity.  
Second, automatization is a widespread phenomenon that occurs in any motoric action.  
As I have shown and argued, automatization occurs in production of representational 
gesture, especially when the representational gestures are intended to serve the speakers 
cognitively.  In addition, the magnitude of reduction is, which is the result of 
automatization, also varies depending on modality.  In other words, automatization 
leading to reduction in representational gesture is much more observable and prominent 
  131
than in speech and could reduce all the way to a complete absence of performance.  
Third, conventionalization has an effect on the Repetition Effect. Lastly, the notion of 
representational gesture should not be treated as a single class. Although all 
representational gestures are unconventionalized and lack a specific form, they may serve 
different functions for the speakers.  Some are more prone to benefit the speaker 
cognitively, while others are more prone to serve a communicative purpose.  Treating all 
representational gestures in the analysis as a single class would lead to an imprecise, and 
possibly a false conclusion.   
 Other than these arguments, I have also highlighted the importance of maintaining 
a tighter experimental control if one wishes to investigate how speakers model the state 
of knowledge of the listener.  In other words, an interaction must be kept to a minimum, 
or better yet, be absent, to truly test speakers’ assumption of the state of knowledge of the 
listener. Conversely, when interlocutors are able to freely interact, it is important to 
consider the interactional aspect, both verbal and non-verbal, in the analysis and not only 
analyze the production of the speakers, not the behavior of all interlocutors. This suggests 
that further studies should carefully manipulate or monitor interaction as an independent 
variable. Detailing the types of interaction and their effects on speech and/or gesture 
should provide a more complete understanding of the role interaction plays in 
conversation.  
For future directions, other sequences of listeners, e.g., A-A-B-C, are encouraged 
in order to clearly tease apart possible fatigue effect; moreover, to observe what floor in 
reduction is in gesturing. It is possible that participants may stop gesturing all together, or 
a there could be a type shift from a representational gesture to a beat gesture.  It would 
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also be interesting to observe how speakers refer to the referent (i.e., the dough) across 
tellings.  That is, observing the use of definite and indefinite articles in the first and 
subsequent referents (possibly demonstratives) would yield insights to the extent to 
which speakers model the state of knowledge of the listener via grammar.   
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